Since Update 3.2, much has changed. The seven person Coroner’s Inquest jury deliberated only 90 minutes before unanimously finding the officers justified in shooting Erik Scott. Considering the unchallenged evidence presented by the prosecutors, there was no other reasonable verdict. Yet, in at least one instance, the public was treated to the bizarre spectacle of prosecutors trying to discredit one of their own witnesses whose testimony--perhaps coming as a surprise to prosecutors--did not adhere to prosecution theory.
We know more of the facts to at least some degree of certainty, but most of the evidence, and the most potentially accurate and telling evidence, has not yet been produced. It will doubtless take the discovery process of the civil trial Erik’s father, William Scott, has announced for a reasonable semblance of the complete story to unfold. It seems clear that the authorities are not going to provide more than has been made public unless they have no choice, and in the case of any potential videotape, perhaps not even then. More on this shortly.Before we get into analysis of the 9-11 transcript (available here) and a partial transcript of police radio traffic (available here), we’ll address the concerns of Confederate Yankee commenters on Update 3.2 and add additional information.
A commenter asked why officers are allowed to keep their weapons when under suspicion in a shooting. Officers are citizens and are entitled to the presumption of innocence until they are proven guilty. In addition, in the daily pursuit of their duties, even the most competent, scrupulously honest officers make enemies, many of whom are not known to them, enemies who might be tempted to take revenge if they suspected an officer did not have the means to protect himself or his family. If a case is so clearly egregious that an officer is under arrest or likely to be arrested, their superiors may take possession of their weapon(s). This option is always open, but generally not used in any but the most obvious cases. Every police agency has its own internal policies and procedures, but the rationale I’ve outlined is quite common.
UPDATED TESTIMONY/EVIDENCE:
(1) Officer William Mosher fired first and believed he shot Scott twice in the chest, but Medical Examiner testimony placed one of his shots in Scott’s chest and another in Scott’s thigh, though which thigh is, at the moment, unclear. This pattern of shooting would be consistent with high stress shootings where the first shot is more or less on target and the second or subsequent shots are substantially lower as the officer “jerks” the trigger, thrusting the muzzle downward.
(2) Officer Thomas Mendiola fired four shots, reportedly all striking Scott in the back. Mediola testified that he believed that each shot was made necessary by the continuing danger posed by Scott. As analysis will establish, such “danger” was surpisingly brief. However, it has also been established, as mentioned in Update 3.2, that one of these rounds struck Scott in the buttocks and traveled upward through his torso coming to rest in his chest. With this updated information, a scenario that may be more accurate than any we’ve been able to propose before is now possible.
(3) Officer Joshua Start fired one shot, but where it struck is unclear. The ME testified that one round hit Scott in an armpit, apparently under an upraised arm, but it’s not clear whether Mendiola or Start fired that shot. It is unlikely that Mosher fired that particular shot for reasons that will be addressed shortly.
(4) Las Vegas Firefighter/EMT Chris Thorpe was among the first medical personnel to treat Scott. He found Scott facedown and handcuffed with no heartbeat and no breathing and asked the police to remove the cuffs. The officers complied and Scott was placed on a backboard and into an ambulance. While enroute to the hospital, Thorpe found a .380 Ruger semiautomatic handgun (which appeared to be an LCP model in a photograph of a Metro detective displaying it during the Inquest) in one of Scott’s pockets--presumably his pants pocket, and magazines in the other. He gave them to an officer who was accompanying them. While the LCP is a small handgun, missing the weapon and several magazines in Scott’s pants pocket does not speak well of the officers and may offer some insight into their post shooting states of mind.
(5) Officer Mosher testified that Scott was asked to leave by Costco employees and refused. In the transcript, Costco Security Employee Shai (pronounced “Shay”) Lierley told the dispatcher several times that Scott was told that weapons weren’t allowed, but did not tell the dispatcher that Scott was asked to leave, nor did the dispatcher ask that particular question. However, in the partial radio transcript, a dispatcher does tell responding officers that Scott was asked to leave, despite not being specifically told this by Lierley. Mosher also said that Costco told the police that Scott was showing signs of “ED” or “excited delerium.” The 9-11 transcript does not support this contention. Lierley was, as far as is currently known, the sole Costco employee providing information via cell phone to the police dispatcher as he followed Scott throughout the store. While Lierley did say that Scott was possibly under the influence of drugs, he also said that Scott “...may just be really hyperactive...” However, a dispatcher did tell responding officers “Male is possibly ED.” Apparently, the dispatcher made an assumption about this and used common police jargon, but in so doing, may, combined with telling the officers that Scott refused to leave, have unintentionally ratcheted up the degree of danger Scott represented in the minds of the responding officers. In this, Mosher testified truthfully about what he knew, but what he knew was likely false or at best, an unintentional misrepresentation.
(6) There is continuing confusion regarding the commands given by the officers prior to shooting Scott. A transcript of the 9-11 call introduced at trial indicates the following commands, all delivered in the space of a few seconds: “Put your hands up where I can see them, drop it, get on the ground, get on the ground.” Witnesses have testified to these commands (and more): “Don’t do that, don’t do that, get on the ground, drop it, get down, drop your weapon.” Listening to the 9-11 transcript, I could clearly hear “Get your hands where I can see them,” immediately followed by gunshots. I am unaware of any clear accounting of which officers spoke which of these commands, to say nothing of any others, in which order and in response to which actions by Scott--if any. However, the 9-11 transcript, difficult as it can be to understand (more on this in the analysis section), suggests that there were a number of conflicting commands delivered by more than one officer within the span of a few seconds, giving Scott little or no time to understand or respond.
(7) The police testified that the Costco video recording device was broken prior to the shooting and not repaired until thereafter, thus, absolutely no video of Scott’s actions inside the Costco store or of the shooting itself is available. Shai Lierley’s testimony supported the police account, stating that on July 7th, the Wednesday before Scott’s shooting on Saturday, July 10th, all store video was broken and was not repaired until after the shooting. That a major chain retail store in a major city would allow all of its security video to be out of service for even a day, let alone most of a week, beggars belief. Allowing their best source of defense against false claims and frivolous lawsuits to be out of order for one second longer than necessary suggests gross negligence on the part of Costco management. This is particularly true in Las Vegas, which has no shortage of state of the art video equipment and equipment suppliers, and even if this was not so, Los Angeles, where virtually any kind of related equipment can be had, is only a day trip (4 hours, 20 minutes according to Google Maps) away. Even if parts or equipment had to come from across the nation, virtually anything can be delivered overnight. The alternative explanation is substantially less innocent.
(8) Lierley also added interesting testimony that was apparently not echoed by any other witness. Remember that Lierley was following Scott while speaking to a dispatcher by cell phone. He was obviously close enough to the entrance to see the shooting (he told the dispatcher he was about ten feet away from Scott), but was just as obviously behind Scott. Lierley testified that an officer--presumably Mosher--touched Scott, who pushed his arm away. Lierley testified that Scott immediately raised his left hand above his shoulder while simultaneously going for his gun on his right side with his right hand. Lierley demonstrated these motions while testifying and his right hand went to his hip as if Scott’s holster was on his right hip. However, it is clear that Scott’s weapon was holstered at the small of his back under his shirt. The motion Lierley demonstrated could not have allowed Scott to reach that handgun. Nothing supporting this account is audible on the transcript.
(9) Howard Brooks, a public defender, testified that he saw Scott “walking normally” with all of the other customers leaving the store. Brooks said that Mosher yelled “drop it,” and fired instantly. Brooks testified that Scott began falling forward when two other officers (Mendiola and Start) approached and fired into Scott’s back. Brooks testified that he made a point of looking for a gun, but did not see one. Brooks is the witness that the prosecutors took pains to discredit, and considering his testimony, that’s understandable.
(10) Clayton Phillips, a Costco employee, testified that officers yelled “get down, drop your weapon” and that Scott reached for his gun, causing the officers to fire. His recollection of the commands issued differs significantly from the many differing versions in the recollections of others.
SHOOTING ANALYSIS:
I’ve suggested a possible shooting scenario in past updates. Then and now I am hampered by a lack of a complete Inquest transcript which may or may not answer all of the questions necessary to know with certainty what happened, particularly since no cross examination, which would have allowed much greater detail to emerge, was allowed. If no video of the shooting is ever produced, the task is not impossible, but much more difficult. What remains unknown (and please, gentle readers, if you know where to find this information, let me know) is the exact location of each officer throughout the encounter, the muzzle to impact distance of each round fired, the exact sequence of firing and location of impact of each round, their tracks through Scott’s body to their eventual resting places as well as many other pertinent factors. Accordingly, any analysis at this point may be incorrect in few or many ways, but there is value in trying to understand and reconcile conflicting testimonies. And there would be value for Scott’s parents in seeing that a competent, independent autopsy is conducted as soon as possible to conclusively gather this information. Hopefully, it has not deteriorated or been altered or destroyed. Known testimony does suggest a more narrow range of possibilities than those of a week ago.
It now seems virtually certain that Scott was directly facing Officer Mosher throughout the confrontation and that the range from his muzzle to Scott’s body was quite short which would have greatly aided his marksmanship if the police account of only seven rounds fired, all of which hit Scott, is accurate. Mosher’s first shot likely struck Scott in the chest, and his hurried second shot was “jerked,” by a heavy, reflexive pull of the trigger and squeezing of the grip of his handgun rather than a consistent, progressive squeeze of the trigger in insolation, downward, striking Scott in the thigh.
To this point, it has been unclear exactly how Scott came to be shot in the back, but all testimony to date seems to indicate that after being shot by Mosher, Scott fell immediately to his knees and from there, in one continuous motion, to his face on the ground. In other words, immediately after Mosher’s rounds hit Scott, he began falling forward, toward Mosher, ending up prostrate, face down on the ground, closer to Mosher than he was when Mosher opened fire.
Within a second, likely less, Officers Start and Mendiola opened fire, again probably from close range, and at least Officer Mendiola must have been firing from behind Scott as he fell to his knees and then forward onto his face. This would explain the round that struck Scott in the buttocks and tracked through his torso into his chest. This round was likely fired last, hitting Scott as his upper torso pitched forward while his knees remained in contact with the ground, leaving Scott’s torso momentarily a bit less than parallel with the ground, his head slightly below the level of his buttocks. Unless the officer who fired this shot was on or near the ground when he fired--and there appears to be no such testimony--this is the only rational explanation currently available to explain this shot. At this point, Scott’s back would have been extremely difficult to hit unless an officer was standing almost directly over Scott, pointing his weapon almost straight downward. This scenario also accounts for the tendency of repeated rounds often to track downward due to trigger jerking. Paradoxically, this would have prevented the Officers from shooting each other. Officer Mendiola, rather than calmly and with deliberate, expert trigger control, lowering his muzzle with each shot to track Scott's falling back, jerked shots two through four, driving the muzzle consistently downward and by chance (to say nothing of dumb luck), ensuring that those rounds would strike Scott rather than Mosher or bystanders. The rounds may have even assisted gravity in driving Scott’s upper body forward. If this scenario is correct, the bullet tracks for at least some of these rounds should have been angled upward, back to front, as Scott’s body pitched forward.
Still unexplained is the round that struck Scott in the armpit. This would have essentially required that Scott’s arm be raised, which would be particularly problematic for the police if the round struck Scott’s right armpit as it would indicate that his arm remained raised and was not, therefore, reaching for his handgun. This would also practically require that the officer, possibly Officer Start, was on Scott’s flank, perhaps toward his back, as he fired and not standing near Officers Mosher or Mendiola. It is also possible that Scott may have momentarily turned his side toward the officers behind him, but this too is currently not clear. The timing of this round, which was likely one of the two rounds that the ME testified struck Scott’s heart, is important in helping to determine Scott’s physical and mental capacities throughout the encounter, but is, as far as I can determine, still unknown, or at least has not been made public.
If the scenario took place as I have suggested, there are a number of additional problems for the police. The locations of bystanders and their exposure to police fire remains unknown. Were citizens standing between Officers Start and Mendiola and Scott? Could the Officers clearly see Scott and his every motion as he was confronted by Officer Mosher? From the beginning of the encounter until they ceased fired? Each of them? If Scott was in fact between Mendiola and Start and Mosher as would be required by the scenario I’ve suggested, the officers were essentially a circular firing squad, and Mosher was in the most immediate danger of being hit by friendly fire, particularly as Scott’s body dropped to the ground as his fellow officers poured fired into the rapidly diminishing target of his back. If this is indeed the case, and with what is known, it seems the most likely scenario, the three officers are fortunate indeed that they did not shoot themselves or innocent bystanders.
In Update 3.2, I noted Metro Captain Patrick Neville who assured the public that they were never in danger as the officers were careful to choose a pillar (as in one, single pillar) that supported a canopy as a bullet backstop. As I noted, for this to be even remotely plausible, all three officers must have been facing Scott and must have been closer than shoulder to shoulder so as to align their weapons in a direct line with the pillar as the termination point for any errant rounds, and with Scott’s body directly intersecting that straight line of fire. In addition, they would have had to have been capable of, within mere seconds of simultaneously realizing that they needed a backstop, seeing the pillar, recognizing its size and composition as appropriate to the task, and moving into position relative to Scott and the pillar to use it as a backstop. Absent this simultaneous thought process, we are apparently expected to believe that it was merely dumb luck that all of the stars, so to speak, aligned in a once-in-a-million-year happenstance. If the officers were not all facing Scott, Captain Neville’s assurance is rendered even more dubious as the officers were essentially using each other (and everything and everyone around them) as a backstop. A final major problem with the police version of supernatural attention to public safety is that unless the pillar was substantially wider than a human body and was made of materials that would absorb and hold, rather than deflect, incoming rounds, it would have served not as a backstop, but as a random ricochet generator. Most support pillars are made of concrete, structural steel, or some combination of these. Even rounds striking at a direct right angle in every plane would experience some degree of spatter (fragmentation of the lead core and copper jacketing of the bullets), potentially injuring those close by. At virtually any other angle, ricochets are a virtual certainty.
There remains one additional interesting item. The ME testified that she could not determine the distances of the Officer’s muzzles from the impact points on Scott’s body. Forensic scientists hired by Scott’s family should conduct gunpowder patterning and residue tests at varying distances using, if possible, the officer’s weapons and the same ammunition used during the shooting. If not, identical weapons and ammunition should be used. I do not suggest that the ME testified falsely, but at the ranges at which these rounds may have been fired, it seems unlikely that gunpowder tattooing was either not present or was so indistinct as to render any meaningful analysis impossible.
THE 9-11 AND PARTIAL DISPATCH TRANSCRIPTS:
In analyzing the 9-11 call, certain difficulties were apparent. The recording was taken from a recording of the original call, which was played on 09-23-10 in the Inquest and recorded on the spot by an unknown brand and model of video recorder in less than ideal acoustic conditions. While the voices of the dispatcher and Shai Lierley are consistently intelligible, there is substantial background noise of various kinds. While Lierley does not specify that he is speaking on a cell phone while following Scott throughout the store, the transcript strongly suggests that this is what he was doing. It is interesting that when the Dispatcher asked if and how Lierley was keeping Scott in sight (particularly asking if he was tracking Scott via camera), he said nothing at all about having no video capability, but only ”I’m full observation.” If no video was available, wouldn’t Lierley have told the Dispatcher? The sounds of people talking and of the kinds of hubbub one commonly hears in busy, warehouse sized retail stores like Costco on a Saturday are also continuously audible in the background.
What is odd is that what appears to be police and dispatcher radio traffic can also be, more or less continuously, heard in the background. Please keep in mind that I do not have sophisticated audio filtering equipment and am relying on the Mark I Human Ear, two each, listening to a recording of a recording. That said, this is particularly odd as dispatchers are commonly supplied with individual headsets which incorporate sensitive microphones that virtually eliminate any background noise, even when they have opened their microphones to speak. This is a necessity in a busy dispatch center where multiple dispatchers are answering phones, talking with each other, clacking computer keyboards and speaking with multiple officers by radio. There is no question about the background noise coming from Lierley’s side of the conversation as cell phones generally have continuously open microphones, but it is quite unusual to hear the amount of apparent background noise coming from the police side of the conversation. In fact, there are several points in the recording, which lasts approximately 14:40, when background noise becomes overwhelming and eliminates coherent speech for lengthy periods. I am unable to determine the cause of this with the methods available to me.
The time stamp that accompanies the transcript begins with “Las Vegas Police,” at approximately 1:08. While intelligible, portions of the tape are difficult to understand, and it is impossible to be accurate to the tenth of a second, so all time frames should be considered to be approximate rather than absolutely definitive. My best guess is that they’re accurate to +-1 second. The entire transcript is not reproduced here. Much of the transcript is the kind of routine information gathering common to such calls and has no particular bearing on our analysis. One of the most significant problems that certainly will have some effect on this analysis is that the 9-11 transcript lasts approximately 14:40 while the radio transcript, which is billed as a partial transcript, runs for more than 17 minutes. Radio transmissions and my comments will be enclosed in brackets and indented.
1:11 (Shai Lierley tells the Dispatcher): “Ah, we just approached him because he had firearms on himself, and we’re telling him he can’t have a firearm inside our store...”
1:22 (SL): NO, we’re--we approached him right now telling him he can’t have a firearm, and he’s just acting a little erratic about it, telling me he’s a Green Beret, and he has a right to carry.
2:09 (Dispatch): “Where does he actually have it that you see it? SL responds: “Ah, it’s on the back end of him...” The dispatcher inquires further and SL says the weapon is “...tucked in the back of his pants...”
[By this point, it is likely that another dispatcher has made the initial radio call to officers. The partial radio time stamp shows this as 6:53. “Units in V3, a 413--man with a gun--at Costco...The male is inside the business to the rear of, has a 413--gun--that’s tucked into the back of his pants. We’re still landline.” Multiple officers and a police helicopter immediately acknowledge and head for the Costco. The 9-11 and radio transcripts time stamps are not synchronized, however, police records should be synchronized, or can be synchronized with proper equipment.]
2:20 (D): “Right. And he didn’t threaten anybody with it or anything like that?”
2:22 (SL): “No. It’s just that he’s acting real erratic, and then, uh, just like ripping open our products...”
[By this point, Lierley is speaking very rapidly and his voice is in a higher register. He is obviously excited. He does become calmer late in the recording.]
3:09 (SL): “He, he he may be high. I mean he’s just real fast real dodgity so...” (interrupted by the dispatcher).
3:17 (D): “Um, he-s--he’s not removing clothing or anything?”
[This is an odd question. Absent a specific reason to believe that Scott was taking off his clothing, such as the crime being reported was indecent exposure or something similar, it’s difficult to imagine why the Dispatcher asks it.]
3:19 (SL): “No."
3:20 (D): “So would you say he’s being violent to merchandise?”
[This too is an odd question. Few people who think that someone in a store is throwing merchandise about would infer that they were being violent toward merchandise, toward inanimate objects. Because it is the only question of this type, and because it is so brief, perhaps the Dispatcher is hunting for reasons to continue her belief that Scott is a dangerous, continuing threat, perhaps it's a sort of unusually lengthy verbalized pause, or she may just be thinking out loud before fully forming those thoughts.]
3:22 (SL): “Ah, yes, just--just throwing it around, and then trying to put all these canteens into one small bag. And when a couple managers have approached him and asked him if they could help, he starts saying no, he wants a certain type.”
[Approximately 1:10 later, at 8:03 on the radio timestamp, the Dispatcher tells the responding officers: “The male inside the business is acting erratic, throwing merchandise around, possibly high on unknown type of 446-- narcotics or drugs.” Remember that the radio transcript is not continuous. It’s not possible to tell exactly when these radio calls went out, but it may be reasonable to assume that this particular call would not have been made until the Dispatcher received the information from Lierley.]
[Approximately 13 seconds later, at timestamp 8:16, Dispatch transmits: “...they are requesting CIT--Critical Incident Team--Male is possibly ED--experiencing “excited delerium.” Lierley did not say this, so it’s apparent that this is an assumption made by the Dispatcher using common police jargon/verbal shorthand. However, this would have immediately ratcheted up the internal danger level indicator, as would calling for the CIT, in every responding officer’s brain.]
4:15 (D): “Do you have somebody in the front that can direct us to this guy?
4:16 (SL): “Ah, yeah. I mean (unintelligible).”
[At 5:12 Lierley is telling someone, repeatedly, to meet the responding officers “up front.”]
5:19 (D): “Is it still tucked into his belt?”
5:20 (SL): “Yeah, it’s tucked into the back end and with--with a concealed holster.”
6:20 (SL): “But he may just be really hyperactive or what not.”
7:18 (D): “Okay. Just let me know when you see them. Are you watching him on a camera?”
7:20 (SL): “No, ah, I’m full observation.”
7:21 (D): Okay. How is he behaving right now?”
7:22 (SL): “Ah, the same. He’s just like fidgety. Now he’s kinda like, ah, talking loud to his girlfriend right now, saying he has the right to carry his firearm.”
[Notice that Lierley has moderated his initial characterization of Scott, who is now, perhaps merely “hyperactive, “dodgity,” or “fidgety.” Note too that Scott was not “talking loud” to Sterner, but was “kinda talking loud.” The Dispatcher does not inform the responding officers of what seems a significant change in Scott’s behavior, deescalating rather than escalating, as reported by Lierley.]
[Approximately 1:02 later, after the 8:16 transmission at 9:18, the Watch Commander transmits: “Have those units shut down code when they get close. Let’s not get this guy more excited than he already is.” This is obviously a wise decision. At 9:53, the Dispatcher transmits a description of Scott, which includes the location of his handgun.]
10:02 (D): “Right. Like if you would just let me know when where he goes until we get there.”
10:04 (SL): “Yeah. Yeah, yeah, no problem.”
10:16 (D): “...We have a unit that’s actually arriving, so let me know when you see them. And you have somebody waiting in front, right?”
[For approximately a minute at this point, there is loud static/background noise that makes understanding the 9-11 transcript virtually impossible.]
[Approximately 3:45 later, at 13:18, the Dispatcher radios: “It looks like the subject is still inside the business, argumentative with the manager who asked him to leave, telling him there’s no 413’s allowed inside the business, break (used on the radio when the person transmitting needs to stop for a second but intends to continue a longer transmission without interruption). The manager is a Green Beret and is allowed to carry a 413. He’s throwing merchandise around; he’s still in aisle 126 in the camping area, break. He appears to be fidgety. A female joined the male. She’s described as Hispanic, 30’s, black long hair, wearing black tank and blue jeans. Security’s going to be standing outside the business in front of, to wait for officers to direct, brea. He’s walking through the camping area towards the front of the business on the main aisle.”]
[Notice that the dispatcher has confused the manager with Scott, unless the manager was a Green Beret who was allowed to carry in the store. If this is the case, it’s possible that Scott was not calling himself a Green Beret, and Lierley and the Dispatcher were confused about that, but there appears to be no information clarifying this point. The Dispatcher also tells the officers that Scott has been asked to leave, but has refused. She did not get this information from Lierley, but apparently assumed it. “Throwing merchandise around,” was never clarified, but it’s reasonable to believe that the officers took it in its most threatening sense. And again, Scott was described as “fidgety.”]
10:21 (SL): “Yes.”
11:01 (D): “Do you see him yet, Shai?”
[By this point, an officer at the store has asked the Watch Commender for permission to “...start slowly evacuating people out of the business without alerting anybody...” and has received it. However, it appears that Costco simply made a PA announcement, without explanation, telling everyone to evacuate at once. The police interview of Samantha Sterner, made after the incident, revealed that when this announcement was made, she told Scott she thought he might be the cause, which surprised him. Nevertheless, they began calmly walking out of the store with all of the rest of the shoppers.]
11:02 (SL): “Ah, no ma’am.”
11:03 (D): “Yeah, they might be waiting for somebody else to get there. There’s actually quite a few units that are coming, Okay?”
11:13 (SL): “It was all like they had six big boys come in. And he ended up having a big old knife on him. We had one where another guy got stabbed.
11:17 (D): “Oh no.”
[This story, told by Lierley, may indicate a predispostion to overreact by local Costco security personnel based on recent incidents. The dispatcher’s “Oh no,” said with a tone of apparently genuine shock and surprise, is itself surprising as most Dispatchers in similar situations have no time for stories, embellishments, or ramblings by those to whom they are speaking, and rather than listen, tactfully redirect them.]
[At 14:06 on the radio time stamp, an officer, apparently at the store, transmits: “...manager says it’s escalating inside and he’s still talking loudly and destroying merchandise.” It is difficult to reconcile the 9-11 transcript with the radio transcript, so it is hard to determine where this information is coming from, possibly from a store manager who approached an officer with information that was, by then, outdated. It is apparently not from Lierley, but it would certainly have the effect of increasing the Officer’s sense of danger and urgency.]
11:18 (SL): “Henderson. Yeah, we were saying that we are playing it real safe on some of our shops now.”
11:21 (D): “Oh, heck yeah. You have to.
11:25 (D): “Which way is he walking?
12:01 (SL): “Um, up towards the front.”
12:02 (D): “And he’s walking fast?”
12:04 (SL): “Yeah, he’s...so...he, he’s lifting up his fire...well...he’s keeping it up but he’s keeping his hand on the firearm. Pulling up his pants.
12:07 (D): “He’s putting his hand on it?”
12:08 (SL): “Yeah, but he just took it back off. He was putting his hand on it. Pulling it up, but then...walking towards the front now...”
[What Lierley is observing is not at all threatening, and should be obvious to anyone who carries a concealed weapon, which will tend to pull one’s belt and pants continuously downward. Scott was merely readjusting his holstered handgun to ride more comfortably. In other words, he's trying to keep it concealed. Fortunately, it does not appear that this information was transmitted to the Officers, who, had they heard it, might have been even more nervous about the confrontation with Scott. At 15:45, an officer transmits “...we need units to clear these people out of here. We’re attempting to evacuate right now; get as many people out as possible.” At this point, none of the officers know who Scott is or where he is, yet they’re trying to evacuate the entire store. This is not good tactics.]
13:22 (D): “Is he walking out?”
13:23 (SL): “Yeah, are we are we...evacuating the building.”
14:03 (D): “Now are they, uh, is he walking outside now?”
[An Officer radios at 17:36: “We’ve got two officers here at the front doors watching everybody come out.” Seconds later, the Dispatcher transmits that she is still speaking with Lierley by phone and employees are still watching Scott “...due to him ripping open packages. They’re concerned of a 414A.” It appears that the Dispatcher is reiterating prior information as the 9-11 transcript indicates that Scott was opening packages some time earlier, but not at the time of this transmission. Adding that Scott is committing a “414A,” a petty thief, is strange at this point in the incident, considering the seriousness of the potential threat posed by Scott. Perhaps the Dispatcher realized she had not yet mentioned that possibility and decided to add it to be sure she covered all bases.]
14:05 (SL): “Yes, he’s about ten feet away. I see the officer standing at the door right now.”
14:07 (D): “Who is?”
14:08 (SL): “I see the officers right now.”
14:09 (D): “You see them?”
14:10 (SL): “Yes.”
14:11 (D): “And do they see him?”
14:12 (SL): “Ah, negative.”
14:13 (D): “Have they walked out the door right now? What is that guy doing right this...”
14:16 (Unidentified Officer’s Voice(s) in Background): “Put your hands where I see them now, drop it, get on the ground, get on the ground...”
[At 14:18, multiple, rapidly fired gunshots can be clearly heard in the background.]
[Officer call sign 2V16, probably Mosher, at 19:11, radios, and the transcript indicates he’s yelling: “2V16, we got shots fired, shots fired!” The Dispatcher asks if anyone is down and 2V16 does not directly reply, saying only “Roll medical.” Approximately 27 seconds later, 2V16 is asked if it is safe for others to enter the building. He does not respond to this question but blurts out: “He pulled a 413 and pointed it in my direction.” Is this an officer who is still unsettled by the shock of a shooting, or an officer trying to get information on the record that he knows will help him later? This was apparently not pursued at the Inquest.]
14:19 (D): “Shay. Hello. Shay.”
14:20 (SL): “He pulled a firearm. Yeah, I’m here, I’m here.”
14:22 (D): “Where is he?”
14:23 (SL): ...shots have been fired, shots have been fired.”
14:25 (D): “I just heard? You hear shots fired Shai?”
15:02 (SL): “Yes I did, shots have been fired.”
15:03 (D): “Who, who fired them?”
15:04 (SL): “The Officers...firearm. You have a man down.”
15:08 (D): “Shai, I’m gonna disconnect. Okay?”
[After about a minute of the loudest static and background noise in the entire transcript, the call abruptly stops, but at 15:15 another caller from Costco calls dispatch to report shots fired. The call lasts until 16:13 when the dispatcher disconnects and says “Oh my God.” The significance of this exclamation, and who made it, are unknown.]
[At 1957, AIR5, apparently transmitting from a police helicopter, radios: “They’ve got him out front, they’re taking him into custody. Hold the traffic.” Scott is apparently being handcuffed. The Dispatcher acknowledges and repeats this information. Other officers radio instructions to prevent anyone from leaving Costco so that they can find witnesses. The transcripts ends approximately 15 seconds later.]
ANALYSIS:
Because of the difficulty reconciling the transcripts, it’s difficult to be precise, however, a number of important issues have been, if not absolutely established as fact, at least, clarified.
(1) The frequent bursts of obscuring background noise, particularly at the end of the 9-11 tape, may be nothing more than technical glitches, but considering the real possibility of the Police mishandling other evidence, may be more sinister. It is, at this point, not possible to tell which.
(2) The Dispatcher’s comments about Scott’s actions and his physical state are only partially accurate. That, and their timing, almost certainly contributed to the continuing escalation of potential danger in the minds of the Officers.
(3) Lierley, is clearly following Scott and keeping him in sight while talking to the Dispatcher by cell phone. Having initially described Scott as being dangerously under the influence of drugs, his later observations sound like a man who is trying to “walk back” his initial observation without making himself seem like an inexperienced alarmist (police officers commonly look down on security guards, and all are aware of this). There is, after all, a substantial difference between someone who is out of control due to drugs, and someone who is only “hyperactive,” or then “dodgity” (whatever that means) and finally, “fidgety” (whatever that means). It seem likely that Lierley observed a man who was, after their initial contact, acting, if not absolutely normally at all times, perhaps a little unusually, but Lierley apparently did not know how to back down. Some of the dispatcher’s odd questions and comments remain inexplicable and did not help to deescalate the situation.
(4) The directions given by Lierley of Scott’s movements and locations are, at best, confusing and are never properly clarified by the Dispatcher. No responding officer would have a clue where “aisle 126” was, but if told that Scott was in the NW section of the building, or was 20 yards from the entrance doors, walking toward them, would have the information they needed. Dispatchers are trained to gather this kind of information, but apparently failed completely in this portion of her task. The result was that the officers were completely surprised by Scott’s abrupt appearance--and his identification--among them.
(5) The Radio transcript establishes that Officer call sign 2V16 said that two officers were at the Costco door. If 2V16 is Officer Mosher (and this is likely), it is probable that the two officers at the door were Start and Mendiola, which fits the shooting scenario I have suggested in this update. The transcript also indicates that what one officer hoped would be a controlled, low key evacuation, inadvertently turned into a simultaneous mass exodus with Scott, unaware of exactly what was happening, just another face in the crowd. The officers had no idea who Scott was, where he was, or what he was doing from minute to minute, and had no control of the situation. However, virtually every Dispatch update on Scott would have elevated the danger level on Officer’s internal threat displays.
(6) Neither transcript reveals which Costco employee identified Scott to the officers, but it is likely Lierley who, only seconds before the officers fired, told the Dispatcher that he could see Scott at the door and was only ten feet away.
(7) From the moment the Officer, probably Mosher, yelled “Get your hands where I can see them” until he fired two shots in rapid succession, only approximately two seconds elapse. The additional five shots are fired with a lapse between Mosher’s shots and theirs of only a fraction of a second, and the entire sequence of events, from Mosher’s yelled command and the final shot is only three to four seconds (from the first command until Lierley told the Dispatcher that shots had been fired, only seven seconds elapsed). It is also clear that a variety of confusing, contradictory commands were coming at Scott, from the Officer in front of him, and likely from two Officers behind him who he could not see, only adding to his shock and confusion.
The Officers were clearly caught by surprise to find Scott, a man who moments earlier walked past them and was obviously unremarkable, suddenly identified as the suspect, in their midst. Drawing down on him, their commands and responses were hasty, uncoordinated, and everyone in the immediate area including themselves was in danger, but not from Scott, from the Officers, who were likely pointing their weapons at each other with Scott between them (due to "tunnel vision" they would almost certainly have been unaware of the danger). Scott had, from the sound of the first command, only about two seconds to save his life. Witnesses testified that he was clearly “surprised”-- anyone would be--but given the time frame, he did not have sufficient time to respond to any command before being shot in the heart, and if he did, in fact, reach toward his right side, it may have been nothing more than a last ditch reaction to the surprise and stress, an attempt to disarm himself and defuse the situation. It was almost certainly not an attempt to shoot the Officers.
Officers did try to employ good tactics in evacuating the store, but did not pay attention to the details necessary to correctly implement those tactics, such as first establishing who Scott was and where he was so that the evacuation could isolate him, rather then compel him and every other shopper to leave en masse. In police work, Officers dealing with dangerous situations often have only seconds to think, decide and act. In this case, they had many minutes, by their usual standards a luxurious span of time. Yet the Officers did not use that time to observe Scott to form their own judgements of his behavior and intent. They did not use the time to positively locate his firearm. They made no affirmative attempt to separate him from the other shoppers. They did not have time for any concern for the positions of innocents before firing, or to consider safe backstops for their fire.
The Officers were never in control of the events; events controlled them, something that all Officers are taught is a worst possible outcome of any situation. Nor was Scott, who surely had no criminal intent, who almost certainly had no intention of harming anyone, in control of events. The sheer size and nature of the police response also contributed to the almost certain outcome.
(8) Officers overlook potential weapons on suspects every day of the week, however, all officers are taught to assume that if a suspect has one weapon, they have more. In this case, the officers had more than enough time and more than enough cause to search Scott thoroughly for an additional weapon. Their negligence in failing to find the .380 ACP Ruger pistol and its magazines, which any competent pat-down should have easily discovered, is disturbing and may speak to a variety of causes other than mere negligence, but insufficient evidence currently exists to venture a reasonable opinion. As the weapon was not a factor in this shooting, the police should be credited with bringing up an embarrassing detail in the Inquest, however, they may have done this primarily to more completely discredit Scott.
The analysis of this shooting is nearing an end. In the next, and likely final, update for the foreseeable future, we’ll explore where the case is, and what will likely happen in the next year or so. We will, of course, continue to provide updated information as it becomes available.
No comments:
Post a Comment