Corollaries

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

We've all heard this Acton quote by now.  How about these corollaries?

"Power tends to kill, and absolute power kills absolutely."

"Corruption tends to kill, and absolute corruption kills absolutely."

Acton's neat dictum seems to work just about any way you phrase it.  No doubt Acton would be pleased at this apparent infallibility...

Two New Links...

The two newest links are TSA Goons and Dog Murderers (turns out cops like killing pets too!).

As Jefferson noted, the price of freedom is eternal vigilance.  In ways too numerous to count, we've fallen well short of that vigilant ideal.  This is our OTHER national debt, comprised of our countless failures to keep government within Constitutional limits.  The interest on our vast indifference is being collected regularly now, and the price is just as high as at any other time in history.

These new links won't bring joy, but to fight we need to know what's going on..  Please, everyone - read.  Get angry.  Do something.  Unless we all join the fight for freedom, that interest payment will consume our entire nation, just as it consumed Erik Scott...

How It Starts, and How it Becomes Too Much to Bear

Excerpt from an excellent article by Wm. Norman Grigg at Pro Libertate HERE, that explains why small infractions by government MUST be taken seriously before they metastasize into large infractions.  An important read, because right here in America it's a lot later than you think...

"When he was three years old, Mohammad Bouazizi's father died. As the oldest son of an indigent family living in Sidi Bouazid -- a town about 160 miles from the Tunisian capital, Tunis -- Mohammad was responsible to provide for his mother and two sisters. He earned a computer science degree, but found that it was of little use in Tunisia's deeply depressed economy.

For years, Bouazizi managed to eke out a living as an unlicensed street vendor, peddling fruits and vegetables from a pushcart. Like others who carried out commerce without official permission, Bouazizi endured harassment from shakedown artists employed by the State, who in the course of the typical visit would steal the equivalent of seven dollars as a "fine." 

As the song says, talk is cheap, but even nickels add up. Even a single nickel is sorely missed when it's extracted at gunpoint from someone barely managing to earn enough to survive. But the contemptuous, arrogant words emitted by the armed functionary to carries out that theft do damage as well. The cumulative effect of such indignities can be enough to drive a despairing man to do desperate things.

He was driven to fatal despair when a municipal police officer confiscated his merchandise. 

The matter could have been cleared up if the officer had accepted the seven-dollar fine for operating an unlicensed merchant stand. But the sadist insisted on berating Bouazizi, slapping him, spitting in his face, and insulting his dead father. Heartsick with inconsolable despair, the young man set himself on fire. Public outrage over this incident grew into a revolt that eventually unseated the U.S.-supported incumbent dictator.

"What happened to him?" The police "happened" to him.

Khaled Said was a 28-year-old businessman from Alexandria, Egypt. Last June, after Said posted a video he had captured of narcotics officers divvying up the proceeds of a drug bust, he was dragged out of an internet cafe, taken to a nearby police station, and beaten to death. A small bag of hashish of the sort used by police everywhere to plant evidence was stuffed down Said's throat.

News of this atrocity was quickly propagated throughout Egypt, engendering a protest movement that eventually grew into the rebellion at Tahrir Square and the still-unfinished effort to uproot Egypt's deeply entrenched, U.S.-subsidized police state.

In police states of the kind Washington has supported in Egypt, Tunisia, and elsewhere in the region, people have been willing to endure a great deal of abuse as long as there was some reasonable expectation that they would be able to feed themselves. It's not surprising to see that forbearance evaporate in the heat of the ongoing economic meltdown, which has left many people without the means to feed their families.  

The triggering incidents that set off revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt were episodes of casual, arrogant abuse by police officers who considered themselves to be imperviously clothed in official privilege. Incidents of that kind are becoming more commonplace here in the putative Land of the Free, and the debt-prolonged illusion of prosperity that has long anesthetized public sensitivities is coming to an end.

Once again, it's not difficult to imagine a situation in which someone, somewhere is going to be pushed too far by an officious prig in a government-issued costume, an atrocity will result -- and then all hell will break loose. 

Given the perverse ingenuity police display in arranging opportunities to impart such abuse, this could happen nearly anywhere, at any time. Meanwhile, those of us who belong to the productive class should avail ourselves of every opportunity to share the following message with representatives of the State's coercive caste:

We don't need you.

We don't want you.

We don't respect you.

We won't tolerate you much longer."

Please click the link and read the rest.  Egypt's Mubarek was a CIA sock puppet from day one of his tyrannical reign.  Ditto for Tunisian thug Ben Ali.  The style of police state that Washington supports in these countries is the EXACT style of police state that's festering here, again supported by Washington and funded with your own money..

Think about this.  Please think.  Are these abuses, and the resulting despair, the product of a mentality that's materially different than the mentality of our own government?  I say they aren't.  In fact, if you're willing to follow the money, there's no denying that all these abuses, foreign and domestic, are US policy.  The one difference here at home is that we can still afford food.  For now.

The game isn't over yet.  It's still in your hands.  What kind of country will you leave to your children and Grandchildren?

Are Cops Constitutional?

As the quote says: "The past is another country.  They do things differently there."

I didn't start out thinking this way, but over the years I've become an ardent critic of American law enforcement. It is no longer debatable that our cops have too much power, and as Acton observed, such power corrupts. Over the years the ranks of all departments have swollen.  The tentacles of federal money are everywhere in local departments.  Even tiny rural departments have SWAT teams and snipers, making it undeniable that nearly every police force in the United States has become highly militarized.  The "Wars on..." (fill in the blank with the hysteria of the week - drugs, terror, guns, whatever...) have enabled a trampling of our rights that no sentient person could be comfortable with.

By numbers and disposition, the police now constitute a standing army.

I've no doubt the Founders would share both my alarm and my moral outrage at these developments. I've done what I can, largely with anecdotes, to wake people up. Now comes a fascinating and scholarly examination of law enforcement at the time of the Founding. Turns out that this was another thing the people did for themselves, thank you very much, and, as usual, they did it quite well. Much better, in fact, than it's done today, and with far more checks and balances.

The notion of government paid cops was quite simply unthinkable at the time, as it should be today.

Here's the abstract: "Police work is often lionized by jurists and scholars who claim to employ "textualist" and "originalist" methods of constitutional interpretation. Yet professional police were unknown to the United States in 1789, and first appeared in America almost a half-century after the Constitution's ratification. The Framers contemplated law enforcement as the duty of mostly private citizens, along with a few constables and sheriffs who could be called upon when necessary. This article marshals extensive historical and legal evidence to show that modern policing is in many ways inconsistent with the original intent of America's founding documents. The author argues that the growth of modern policing has substantially empowered the state in a way the Framers would regard as abhorrent to their foremost principles."

And an excerpt: "Law enforcement in the Founders' time was a duty of every citizen.32 Citizens were expected to be armed and equipped to chase suspects on foot, on horse, or with wagon whenever summoned. And when called upon to enforce the laws of the state, citizens were to respond "not faintly and with lagging steps, but honestly and bravely and with whatever implements and facilities [were] convenient and at hand."33 Any person could act in the capacity of a constable without being one,34 and when summoned by a law enforcement officer, a private person became a temporary member of the police department.35 The law also presumed that any person acting in his public capacity as an officer was rightfully appointed.36

Laws in virtually every state still require citizens to aid in capturing escaped prisoners, arresting criminal suspects, and executing legal process. The duty of citizens to enforce the law was and is a constitutional one. Many early state constitutions purported to bind citizens into a universal obligation to perform law enforcement functions, yet evinced no mention of any state power to carry out those same functions.37 But the law enforcement duties of the citizenry are now a long-forgotten remnant of the Framers' era. By the 1960s, only twelve percent of the public claimed to have ever personally acted to combat crime.38

The Founders could not have envisioned 'police' officers as we know them today. The term "police" had a slightly different meaning at the time of the Founding.39 It was generally used as a verb and meant to watch over or monitor the public health and safety.40 In Louisiana, "police juries" were local governing bodies similar to county boards in other states.41 Only in the mid-nineteenth century did the term 'police' begin to take on the persona of a uniformed state law enforcer.42 The term first crept into Supreme Court jurisprudence even later.43

Prior to the 1850s, rugged individualism and self-reliance were the touchstones of American law, culture, and industry. Although a puritan cultural and legal ethic pervaded their society, Americans had great toleration for victimless misconduct.44 Traffic disputes were resolved through personal negotiation and common law tort principles, rather than driver licenses and armed police patrol.45 Agents of the state did not exist for the protection of the individual citizen. The night watch of early American cities concerned itself primarily with the danger of fire, and watchmen were often afraid to enter some of the most notorious neighborhoods of cities like Boston.46

At the time of Tocqueville's observations (in the 1830s), "the means available to the authorities for the discovery of crimes and arrest of criminals [were] few,"47 yet Tocqueville doubted "whether in any other country crime so seldom escapes punishment."48 Citizens handled most crimes informally, forming committees to catch criminals and hand them over to the courts.49 Private mobs in early America dealt with larger threats to public safety and welfare, such as houses of ill fame.50 Nothing struck a European traveler in America, wrote Tocqueville, more than the absence of government in the streets"

(I debated editing out those annoying footnote numbers, but decided to leave them in to show how well the author documented this work.) This is the kind of scholarship we need if we hope to ever force cops back into a somewhat respectable place in society, if such is even possible at this late date. 

Here's the whole thing, well worth reading and passing around: Are Cops Constitutional?

Reprinted with Permission: Confederate Yankee Analysis

Starting with the post below, I have reprinted Mike McDaniel's expert analysis of the Erik Scott shooting, as originally posted at Confederate Yankee.  Every entry to date is posted in chronological order, starting with the first post last year and running through 19 posts to the present..

There is no better way to get up to speed on this case. Mike McDaniel is an English teacher, and his writing reflects that fact.  More significantly, he's an ex-cop of the conscientious and professional sort..  His integrity shows throughout his posts.  He was clearly the kind of cop any of us would have respected.  I'm particularly taken with Mike's knowledge of proper shooting doctrine.  Such ability is far less common than we might wish in police circles, and being qualified in an actual rather than a bureaucratic sense gives real weight to his writing.

Mike tells me he's quite relieved to be out of police work, and given the state of policing in America, I certainly understand.  (Policing's loss was teaching's gain!)  I thank him for the time and thought he's put into articles, and for his unhesitating, cheerful permission to reprint his work here.

Confederate Yankee: Gunned Down in Vegas: What Really Happened to Erik Scott?

I've written about war, rape, massacres, mass murders and terrorism, so I don't easily get disturbed by the content of the stories I cover.

Erik Scott's senseless death is different.

Confederate Yankee: Analysis of a Death: The Erik Scott Shooting

First, My thanks to Bob Owens, proprietor of Confederate Yankee for his invitation to guest blog on the site. I look forward to contributing essays in the future and I have often commented in the past. By way of introduction, I'm a USAF veteran, having served in SAC as a security police officer during the Cold War. I'm also a veteran of nearly two decades of civilian police service, including stints as a patrol officer, trainer of officers, firearms instructor, shift supervisor, division commander, juvenile officer, detective and SWAT operator. I'm an NRA certified instructor and am also certified by the American Small Arms Academy, Chuck Taylor's school. These days, I teach secondary English and am a professional singer, working with a well known symphony orchestra and a variety of other musical endeavors. I'm looking forward to having the kinds of informed exchanges I've often enjoyed on the site.  - -  Mike McDaniel

The death of West Point graduate Erik Scott outside a Las Vegas Costco at the hands of Las Vegas Police officers, is at best, a tragedy. At worst, manslaughter.

First and foremost, understand that I am writing in response to articles I have read about the incident. Anyone how has achieved professional status in the criminal justice system will attest that it’s very difficult to make conclusive, correct judgments regarding cases about which they have no direct knowledge, as I, and virtually everyone writing about this case, do not. However, professional knowledge of policy and procedure might help others to better understand the issues surrounding such cases.

Costco’s Role/Liability: While Nevada law does allow “public buildings” to prohibit lawful concealed carry by posting signs, no such signs were posted at Costco. Any business can ask any customer to leave, but again, apparently no such request was made of Scott. Costco also has a duty to train and properly supervise their security employees, but because the police are refusing to release the 9-11 call, we have no idea what their security employee told the dispatcher or their tone in the telling. A competent security force would surely keep a potentially dangerous customer under surveillance until the police arrived, particularly if they felt they were as deadly dangerous as the police response would tend to indicate, yet at this point, it’s not known whether they watched Scott by actually having security people keep him in sight, by means of internal security cameras, or both. And competent security people would await the police (if for no other reason than because the police should have told them to do just that) and immediately direct the first arriving officers to the potentially dangerous person, but that apparently did not happen. It seems Scott and his girlfriend continued to shop until the general PA system announcement to evacuate, and having no reason to believe it related to them, tried to leave with everyone else. What is known also indicates that Scott and his girlfriend actually walked past several police officers who were presumably already inside the store before store security pointed him out as he exited the front doors.

Unanswered Questions/Issues:
(1) Was Scott actually, clearly asked to leave, and if so, did he refuse?
(2) What, exactly, did the security employee say to the 9-11 dispatcher, and how did he say it? Did the police respond appropriately, given what they knew at the time, or did they overreact?
(3) Did Costco security keep an eye on Scott after the initial contact, and if so, by whom and how? If such video shows a man and woman calmly shopping, that will be, to put it mildly, damaging for Costco and the police. On the other hand, if the video shows an angry, erratic, hostile man, another interpretation may be in order.
(4) Is there internal videotape of Scott and his girlfriend before, during and after the initial encounter, and external video of the shooting? According to Scott’s father, the police have made statements indicating that they have seized internal and external video, but that it won’t be usable--not a good sign. If it supported the officer’s stories, they would surely be glad to use it.

Scott’s Culpability: What, if anything, did Scott do wrong? Let’s assume that he was not, as at least some suggest, irrational, hostile and threatening, but merely a man with his girlfriend on a shopping trip. There is apparently considerable evidence to suggest that this was the case, not the least of which is the apparent reluctance of the police to produce video. Scott was legally carrying his weapon and had no reason to believe he, and it, were not welcome at Costco. While it is unfortunate that he inadvertently exposed it, the mere sight of a holstered firearm should not be unduly alarming, particularly in a state widely known to have concealed carry. Scott, once approached by the store employee, apparently acknowledged his concealed carry status, and not being asked to leave, was within his rights to remain. The police deal with reports of this kind all the time, everywhere in the nation, and certainly do not respond with the kind of numbers and types of officers present in this case. Usually, one or two officers merely observe the person from concealment for a few minutes, approach, ensure that they have a concealed carry permit, and everyone goes on their way. While the police must treat every call where the potential threat of violence is present as unique, not routine, a quick, peaceful resolution to this common call occurs almost all of the time.

We can “what if” ourselves silly. If Scott immediately left, he might still be alive today, but there is no way to know with certainty, particularly since the content of the 9-11 call remains unknown. The police response also makes the outcome less rather than more likely. The available evidence indicates that Scott and his girlfriend continued to shop until the PA announcement of evacuation, and upon leaving the store, were confronted by the officers who found him empty handed. It’s hard to imagine what, absent immediately leaving the store after being confronted by the employee who apparently did not ask him to leave, he might have done differently, and it seems clear that he did nothing illegal, at minimum. Of course, if he was truly hostile, erratic and angry, that may change things, but even then much would depend on exactly how he was acting, when and where, and toward whom.

The Police Role: It’s important to immediately clear up common misconceptions about police procedure and the use of deadly force. Officers must act on the knowledge they have at the time they are dispatched to a call (the role of dispatchers will be examined shortly), and/or must follow the orders of their superiors. Officers acting in good faith, as any reasonable officer would act in the same set of circumstances, if they are acting in accordance with the law and commonly accepted standards of training and police procedure, will usually be accorded a substantial degree of deference by prosecutors and judges. Officers must sometimes make decisions in fractions of a second that may have deadly consequences, and those split second decisions will be analyzed after the fact by those under no imminent threat and with months of time to render a verdict on an officer’s actions. That said, everyone involved, particularly officers, understand that this is their reality. They live it daily, and are responsible for making the right decisions. No one is forced to become a police officer. In a very real sense, they’re used to it and we pay them to be used to it and to keep their heads when all those around them are losing theirs. Quite simply, they are supposed to be able to properly handle deadly force encounters.

The use of deadly force by the police is widely misunderstood. Generally, officers may use deadly force to protect themselves or others where there is an imminent threat of seriously bodily harm or death and the person against whom force is to be used is in a position to carry out that threat. One common way to understand it is to employ three terms: Means, opportunity and jeopardy. Does the suspect have the means necessary to cause serious bodily harm or death, such as a gun or knife? Does he have the opportunity? If armed with a handgun, is it holstered under clothing, or in his hand, quickly rising onto target? If armed with a knife, is he fifty feet away, or five? And finally, is he placing the officer or another in jeopardy? Is he actually taking actions that would convince a reasonable police officer that the threat of serious bodily injury or death is imminent--it’s going to happen and happen in seconds--rather than potentially at some future time. Notice that the standard for decision making is a “reasonable police officer,” not a “reasonable citizen.” The courts have taken notice of the specialized training and experience of police officers and understand that they are better suited than most citizens to make such determinations, which is reasonable.

If means, opportunity and jeopardy are present, an officer is not limited to firing one round from a tiny caliber weapon, nor does he have any obligation to fire a “warning” shot or shots, or to shoot the suspect in the leg or hand, or to employ any other movie action hero cliche. In fact, virtually all police agencies specifically prohibit warning shots or shots intended to wound. This is true for two primary reasons: Officers are responsible for every shot they fire and officers always, always shoot to stop, not to wound or kill. They shoot to stop the suspect from completing whatever action gave the officer the legal justification to shoot in the first place. A warning shot or a shot in the hand or leg will likely leave the suspect able to severely injure or kill others. In fact, a warning shot or wounding shot might be construed in court to indicate that the officer believed that he really did not have legal grounds to use deadly force. The likely best stopping shot is to the brain stem or failing that, the brain, but as those are very small, difficult targets, officers are trained to aim for center mass, the vital organs in the chest. If the suspect dies as a result of being stopped, that matters not at all, legally speaking. And if an officer has the legal justification to shoot, he has the authority, and the responsibility to shoot as much as required to cause the action that gave him justification to shoot to stop. If that takes one round of 9mm ammunition, that’s good. If it takes ten rounds of .44 magnum ammunition, that too is allowed, indeed, it’s required.

Another additional misconception: Hollow point ammunition. The police carry hollow point ammunition because it tends to expand and expend all of its energy in the body rather than over penetrating and ricocheting in unpredictable ways. The military, under international treaties, cannot use hollow point ammunition, but in the military context, it’s better to wound rather than kill soldiers. A dead soldier takes one man out of the fight. A wounded soldier, three, as two of his comrades are required to carry him. Over penetration and ricochet are serious concerns for police officers, particularly in urban areas. While hollow point ammunition may indeed be more deadly when used against the innocent, it is far safer for the police and the innocent when used against the guilty. Fortunately, police shootings of the innocent are uncommon.

The problem is that many police officers have, at best, occasional and incomplete firearm training. Many law enforcement agencies require only annual qualification with courses of fire that are less than demanding. I know of a police officer who was made a sniper on a SWAT team who had never owned a firearm prior to becoming a police officer, in fact owned no firearms as a police officer, having only his department issued weapons, did not carry a handgun off duty, did not fire any weapon unless required to do so for training or qualification and had no precision rifle training whatever. The rationale for his appointment as a sniper remains a mystery. Police officers are not uniformly noted for excellent marksmanship in fire fights. In fact, there are many incidents on record in which officers emptied their weapons at distances at which they could reach out and touch the suspect, yet missed with every shot--as did the bad guys. I don’t suggest that this is true of all police officers, merely that wearing the uniform does not automatically confer magical shooting powers beyond those of civilians. Sometimes, it’s rather the opposite. What is often forgotten is that knowing when to shoot is, in many ways, far more important than knowing how to shoot, and training in this vital skill is also an iffy matter for many police officers. But one additional fact remains: At the moment the suspect has stopped offensive action, shooting absolutely must stop. Shots fired beyond that point are no longer authorized by law and may very well be criminal. Remember, however, that multiple shots may be fired in a deadly force encounter in mere seconds. Yet understand that the police know that these problems exist, should properly train for and are expected to be able to deal with them.

There are, based on what we know about this incident, several other pertinent issues. In any confrontation with a potentially armed suspect (other than those I’ve already outlined involving obviously peaceful citizens carrying concealed weapons), Officers should have their weapons in their hands, but those weapons should be in “low ready”: Trigger finger in register (off the trigger and in contact with the weapon’s frame), muzzle pointed roughly at the level of the suspect’s hips/lower abdomen. This is essential to prevent accidental discharges if the officer is startled or experiences an involuntary muscle contraction, both common results of extreme stress. It is also essential so the officer doesn’t have his arms and weapon in front of his face blocking his view of the suspect and their actions. If shooting is necessary, from ready an officer is in a position to bring his weapon on target with sufficient speed to end the threat, and is in the best position to understand if shooting is actually required and lawful.

It’s also vital that one--and only one--officer assumes the role of the sole giver of commands while at least one additional officer assumes the role of taking physical control of and securing the suspect, which, at some point requires them to holster and secure their weapons as they will be in actual contact with the suspect who might take control of their weapon. If more than one officer is yelling commands, the possibility of fatal mistakes is greatly increased. In fact, these procedures are taught in any competent basic academy tactics class, and are included in the rules and procedures of any competent law enforcement agency. Done properly, the procedure works; it’s a thing of beauty. It offers the greatest protection for everyone present, and the greatest chance that no one will be harmed. Of course, if the suspect is determined to hurt others, refuses to obey orders, or is determined to commit suicide by cop, that’s a different matter and no matter what highly trained and competent officers do, deadly force may be necessary and justified.

Post shooting, it’s essential that the suspect be restrained--handcuffed-- and then immediately disarmed if still in possession of a weapon in any way. If the suspect has dropped a weapon, it should be left in place unless safety concerns make that impossible. There are many stories in police legend of officers who saved cases and ensured that criminals were convicted by upending a bucket or similar item over a crucial piece of evidence. sitting on it, and refusing even the incorrect, unthinking orders of their superiors in order to protect that evidence. It’s also essential that the suspect be given the most immediate medical help that safety will allow. This is essential to establish that the officers were not acting out of anger or malice, but merely doing their lawful duties.

The duty of every officer to tell the truth and to maintain an unbreakable chain of all relevant evidence should go without saying. In this case, surely all witnesses should have been quickly identified and complete statements taken--there were certainly sufficient officers present for that task. All possible video records should have been taken and scrupulously protected. And of course, an attempt to discover if any civilian video was shot should have been made, and if so, the devices should have been taken into evidence with appropriate receipts given to the owners. The officers involved in the shooting should have been immediately relieved of the weapons used in the shooting and other duty weapons issued to them. They should have been immediately separated and individually interviewed, on videotape. If they did not obtain an attorney before speaking with their own investigators, even if they were absolutely blameless, they are fools. In professional, honest law enforcement agencies, officers involved in shootings are criminal suspects unless the facts prove otherwise, and they must expect to be treated that way.

Unanswered Questions/Issues:
(1) Do the Las Vegas police have written policies/procedures pertaining to this and follow those procedures?
(2) Did the police direct the Costco Security employee to wait for the first responding officers so that Scott could be immediately located and identified? This would be absolutely vital for a potentially armed, dangerous suspect and should be revealed by phone or radio recordings.
(3) Did the police actually have legal cause to shoot or did they shoot without sufficient cause? Did they shoot accidently due to poor tactics or training? If there were at least three officers screaming conflicting commands at Scott, that may well be the case. Or was the shooting a tragic accident, the result of inadequate training, or at worst, negligent retention (keeping a potentially dangerous officer on the street)?
(4) After the first officer fired, who fired next and why? He must be able to articulate clear and convincing reasons for firing each and every round. Can he do this, or was he merely panic firing in response to an unexpected gunshot from whom, he knew not?
(5) At what point had the danger passed? As Scott fell, presumably face down to the ground, what clear, obvious and convincing acts on the part of Scott motivated multiple officers to keep firing into his back?
(6) Where was Scott’s weapon--and its holster--at each second of the encounter and its aftermath? Each millisecond must be convincingly accounted for.
(7) What do the videotapes, inside the store and out, show? Is Scott, at any point, out of control, hostile, raging, erratic? If so, to what degree, when and where? Or is Scott a man calmly shopping with his girlfriend? If he was out of control, the police would be expected to want to release the video.
(8) Was Scott screened for drugs? If there were drugs in his system, it would seem likely that the police would be making that information public.
(9) Were the officers immediately separated and kept separate before questioning? What do their statements say?
(10) Which officers fired which shots, when, why, and where did each round go? Perhaps not all of the rounds fired hit Scott. If not, what did they hit? These questions must be answered conclusively in any competent investigation.
(11) At least one ambulance had apparently been called at the same time as the police. How quickly was Scott afforded medical help?
(12) How was Scott’s girlfriend handled by the police? This might provide clues to their mindset.

Preliminary Observations: Again, remembering that those commenting on this case do not have all of the facts, some preliminary observations are not unreasonable. First and foremost, it’s vital to know exactly what was on the 9-11 tape, and the radio transmissions of the dispatcher(s) to all responding officers. Good dispatchers can save lives; bad dispatchers can cause them to be lost. Did the dispatchers involved accurately gather, process and relay the information they received? If not, they might be the first link in the police chain that led to Scott’s death.

It seems clear that the Costco security employee calling 9-11 did so with, at best, second or third hand information. Whether Costco security kept Scott under personal or video surveillance is unknown, but what is known may suggest that they did not, or did so only incompletely, and that they were not waiting for responding officers (the police should have directed the security employee to do this, which is again, something all officer should learn in their basic academy classes), identifying Scott only on the spur of the moment after he had already passed other officers, to whom he apparently posed no threat and to whom he apparently seemed unremarkable. Scott’s sudden appearance and identification appear to have surprised the officers involved in the shooting, putting them at a tactical disadvantage, a situation no officer relishes. They apparently found themselves in the open, with no cover, no direct control over the situation, civilians in the background (the potential line of police fire) and potentially in the way--very bad tactics that competent officers always try to avoid unless they are overtaken by circumstances. It also seems clear that the officers immediately drew their weapons and at least three began shouting conflicting commands, including “drop it,” when all available evidence indicates that Scott’s handgun was never in either of his hands. It would also seem that the officer’s demeanor greatly alarmed Scott’s girlfriend--with good cause--and she did all that she could to fend off what she feared would inevitably happen.

Once the first shot was fired, the other officers may have opened fire sympathetically rather than because of any observable reason for shooting, and may not, in fact, have known, at the time they began pulling the trigger, who fired the first round. Even if they were entirely justified in every shot fired, the four or more shots into the back of a man already dead or dying and face down on the ground, particularly if he had no weapon in his hands or within easy reach does not--at best--speak well of the officers, their training, or their agency, and it is surely a public relations disaster. In fact, in competent firearm training and tactics instruction, officers are taught to fire one or two rounds immediately, then to lower their weapon to ready and assess the necessity of firing again, a process that can be properly done in a second or less. In fact, they should also immediately glance to the right and left to eliminate tunnel vision, an unthinking focus on a tightly restricted field of vision that makes it impossible to see, hear or react to anything else, a common and dangerous human reaction to these situations (two of the officers who fired may have had only a year or less on the job), and what may have happened to each of the officers involved as it usually does in similar situations.

It is not unusual for the police to keep information out of the public eye for a variety of good and lawful reasons, at least until after the initial inquest or preliminary hearing. However, eventually, all of the evidence should be produced, and surely must be produced for the attorneys of the Scott family. If the police are blameless, they should be anxious to release the 9-11 call, the radio transmissions, and most importantly, all video evidence. When the time comes, if they are reluctant to make the evidence public, if evidence has been in any way mishandled, or worse, altered or destroyed, the public would be justified in drawing the most negative and damaging conclusions. After all, if the actions of the police were indeed justified and lawful, the video and audio evidence should exonerate them.
It is standard practice in many professional law enforcement agencies that another, independent agency, such as the state police, investigate officer shootings to remove any suggestion of corruption. Apparently this is not to be the case in Las Vegas. In fact, police procedure for any unattended death, and particularly those involving officer shootings, commonly require that the incident be handled as a homicide until it can be positively ruled out so as to properly deal with evidence and cover all bases. At this point, with admittedly limited information, any competent internal investigator should have serious concerns about the actions of the officers involved. Those concerns might well be eventually alleviated by the evidence, but absent convincing evidence that contradicts initial impressions, it would be hard to imagine how the police were justified in their actions in this case.

Confederate Yankee: The Erik Scott Shooting: Update 2

Comments on the initial article have raised a number of questions that deserve clarification. Perhaps additional clarification of what I learned in my years as a police officer about the police and the world in which they live and work will be useful.

I am no more reflexively pro-police than I am anti-police. I am certainly, as a citizen, against official corruption of any kind. As a former police officer, I am more aware than most of the factors that might tend to corrupt individual officers and police organizations. The police are handicapped in that they are restricted to recruiting solely from the human race. As in all human endeavors, most cops are average, some are below average and some few are excellent. Most officers and agencies are honest and dedicated, taking seriously their oaths to defend and uphold the Constitution. Some, unfortunately, are not and do not. I have no first hand knowledge of the police of Las Vegas or their agency and its leadership. I just don’t know whether it’s an honest or corrupt organization or some mixture of the two. However, I, and others can draw reasonable inferences and conclusions about it from its observed behavior and actions while being always willing to be persuaded by additional facts.

It’s important to understand that line officers and administrative officers are often from two different planets. For working cops, most of the stress of the job doesn’t come from working with the public, but from working with other cops, particularly administrators. In competent, professional agencies, everyone works together as a team. In dysfunctional, corrupt agencies, paranoia and anger reign as everyone is locked in a constant struggle for favor, power and dominance. In such agencies, particularly in large cities, administrators tend to be hired for their political views and loyalties to elected officials rather than for their competence and loyalty to the Constitution and equal enforcement of the law.

It’s also important to keep in mind that in dysfunctional agencies, the worst traits of human nature, those formally and informally suppressed in competent agencies, tend to be manifested at every level. Among these are the tendencies to see life through an “us against them” lens, and to abuse power. The reality is that unless one is a police officer, it’s almost impossible to understand the pressures, professional and social, of the job. It’s not the kind of job that can be left at the office, ever. These pressures do tend to isolate cops from the general public. Good cops handle this rationally and calmly and don’t tend to view the public as the enemy while simultaneously understanding that there are inherent social issues. They also wield their authority, which is considerable, with restraint and humility. It may surprise many to learn that one of the hardest things for many new officers to learn is how to accept and properly use the inherent authority of their position. Most are not power hungry monsters dying to abuse the public and don’t yearn to misuse their authority.

No officer in a competent police agency wants to be involved in a shooting. Yes, it’s human nature to seek excitement, and many cops will admit to being adrenaline junkies, but they understand that the consequences of a shooting, no matter how legitimate, are severe and last a lifetime. They expect that they will be treated as criminal suspects—they do not for a moment expect that anyone will cover for their mistakes--and that even if a shooting is completely justified and no criminal charges result, they will almost certainly be sued by survivors of the victim who will be portrayed as a saint regardless of their actual background. Any officer who indicates a desire to get into shooting situations is a real concern for and danger toward honest, professional cops.

In dysfunctional agencies, it’s quite the opposite situation. Petty local politics can have an enormous effect on law enforcement. There are classes of local citizens who are essentially immune to arrest. Administrators tend to see officers as barely sentient troublemakers who must be tightly controlled to avoid mistakes. Officers resent the lack of trust and respect and are constantly, and wisely, looking over their shoulders. Weak people with few or no leadership skills and faulty knowledge and experience are appointed as supervisors because they are easy to control. Officers know that when someone complains about them—common no matter how good an officer is—they cannot know in advance if they’ll be fairly and professionally treated or thrown under the public relations bus. Does this sound like many dysfunctional workplaces? It should, but when you’re in a business that actually deals in life and death decisions on a daily basis, it’s rather more serious. Even in dysfunctional agencies, corrupt cops can never be entirely sure that their superiors won’t turn on them any second.
Regarding firearms, most working officers fully support the Second Amendment and have no difficulty with citizens carrying concealed weapons. Every competent officer understands that anyone they meet could be carrying a concealed firearm and acts accordingly, with reasonable caution appropriate to each situation. Police administrators, particularly those of large, urban agencies, tend to have exactly the opposite viewpoint. Some would be very happy to disarm the entire population if they could get away with it.

The fact that working police officers almost uniformly support civilian concealed carry, and deal with that issue—without violence--every day, makes the behavior of the Las Vegas Police even more puzzling. We still have no idea of the content of the 9-11 call that forged the first link of the chain that led to Erik Scott’s death, but for officers to act as they did, there are two primary possibilities: (1) They were acting under the impression that Scott was ready to start shooting any and everyone at any second, or (2) They were not in control of themselves and their weapons due to poor training, panic, malice, inexperience, or any combination of these and other factors. The possibility that Scott was a hair-trigger, raging bad guy who not only drew his weapon but pointed it at the police as police spokesmen have claimed cannot be absolutely discounted, but considering what is known at the moment, seems unlikely.

A number of those making comments have expressed concern about the taking of video resources from Costco. Implicit in some of their concerns is the idea that Costco should have adopted an adversarial stance with the police and required them to obtain a warrant. All issues relating to search and seizure of private property are governed by the 4th Amendment, which is explicit in the requirements for warrants, but which does not require a warrant for every search and seizure. This follows from the idea that individuals are protected from “unreasonable” searches and seizures and that there is, therefore, a class of searches which are inherently reasonable and do not require a warrant.

It should be kept in mind that Costco could have, if it wished, refused to turn over any recordings or devices. At that point, the police would have had two options: (1) Seize the recordings and devices anyway under an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, or (2) Obtain a warrant. In order to pursue option one, the police would have to be able to show that unless they seized the materials immediately, there was a substantial risk that the evidence would be altered or destroyed. If one assumes that the officers in this case are acting to cover up criminal negligence, they would surely seize first and apologize later. A warrant in this case would surely have been issued by any judge and if the police had a legitimate fear of tampering while the warrant was being obtained, could have posted officers (a common practice)—it appears that there were more than enough present—to prevent such tampering until the warrant arrived, a process that would be expected to take an hour or less. However, most businesses want a good relationship with the police whether they consider the police to be corrupt or not as the police provide several valuable services for them. Costco likely did not think of objecting to the taking of the materials. If the police ask (I’m assuming they did) and the citizen agrees, no warrant is required. One can legitimately argue that Costco was acting against its own interests in willingly surrendering the materials, but in this case, the end result was a foregone conclusion and resisting would have only slightly delayed the seizure.

The issue is slightly more interesting in the case of a citizen who might have recorded events on a cell phone or video camera. The police would be able to argue with somewhat more plausibility that a citizen unknown to them, as opposed to long established business, would be more likely to damage or destroy evidence, and the same processes of seizing the materials would apply. Might a citizen make copies, post them on the Internet, even send them to their lawyers for safekeeping before turning video over to the police? Certainly, unless there is some specific statute that would address the issue, but that’s quite uncommon.

If police video cameras recorded the events, things become really interesting. If such video exists it has certainly been examined by the police in minute detail. However, absent specific court orders to produce such video, whether its existence is ever acknowledged is an open question. If one assumes that the police in this instance are carrying out a cover up, such video would only be acknowledged and made available if it unambiguously supported the police version of events. Suppressing even the knowledge of such video would in the very least constitute contempt of court, and probably, a crime in most states.

Another concern related to the officers shouting commands at Scott, and suggested that their commands were not intended to resolve the situation peacefully, but to confuse witnesses into supporting the police version of events.

There is a shred of truth in this idea, but not in the manner implied. Competent training in this facet of police work requires that one officer, and one alone, issue commands, and that the most effective command when the suspect is initially confronted is “don’t move.” Officers are told to do this loudly, clearly, and slowly giving the suspect sufficient time (which can be seconds) to process the command, if safety allows. This is done to control the situation and to minimize mistakes. Every officer understands that the clearer and more simple their commands and actions, the more likely witnesses are to correctly remember, and if the officers act professionally, this will benefit everyone. I need not mention that some officers are not professional and that some act in bad faith, cynically playing for onlookers the better to cover their malfeasance. I have to believe that readers can understand that the potential for bad, malicious behavior is present in any human endeavor, so I need not repeatedly offer it as a disclaimer. Based on many years of experience in similar situations, my best take on what actually happened is that three or more officers were likely so adrenaline fueled that they began yelling whatever came to mind and likely weren’t aware of what their fellow officers were yelling, if they heard anything other than their own voices at all. In these circumstances, I’ve seen officer’s voices raise an octave or two as they screamed mindless obscenities rather than rational commands at a suspect.

Yet another concern revolved around the police practice of handcuffing suspects they’ve just shot as soon as possible and leaving them restrained until, and possibly even after, it’s safe for medical care. Some were also concerned that the police apparently did not themselves try to treat Scott. Unless an officer is a certified EMT or paramedic, few if any police agencies will allow them to engage in medical treatment, particularly if other medical professionals are on the scene. This doesn’t mean that an officer would be required to withhold direct pressure to a badly bleeding wound or refuse to provide CPR, for example, but if an officer is providing medical treatment, he is not fulfilling his primary duties. It is also essential that suspects be restrained, even if they are not an immediately apparent threat. Human beings are amazingly resilient, and someone who appears unconscious one moment, may suddenly leap to their feet and inflict great harm on officers or medical personnel, even when mortally wounded. This does seem cold hearted, but to those who, like the Shadow, know what evil lurks in the hearts of men, and who have learned that lesson the hard way, it’s rational and necessary. If the police abuse this procedure, if they inflict unnecessary pain or unnecessarily delay medical treatment, they are reprehensible and criminally liable, but that does not invalidate the necessity or wisdom of this policy.

On the new development front, Scott’s father has posted extensively (http://erikbscottmemorialblog.blogspot.com/) on the drugs that would likely be found in Erik’s system. That any drugs at all were present will tend to be supportive of the police version of events, and will certainly be played that way by the police, and possibly some elements of the Las Vegas press. William B. Scott’s account indicates that Erik Scott suffered from spinal damage likely incurred during airborne training, which is certainly plausible, and that he was under treatment for intractable pain. As a younger man, I sometimes scoffed at those who suffered from debilitating neck and back injuries until, that is, I suffered a neck injury on the job. I scoff no longer as each turn of my head feel and sounds like a bag full of gravel. William Scott also suggests that the medications Erik was taking were all obtained by legitimate prescriptions. These assertions are easily proved or disproved through the testimony of his attending physicians. Whether the police rely on such direct, legitimate testimony or produce spin doctors, so to speak, to paint a differing picture may also help to clarify police intentions. The Coroner’s inquest is scheduled for this week in Las Vegas, and I’ll update what I can after that event, if it occurs.

Some have suggested that the police acted with malice aforethought, in other words, planned Scott’s killing before it occurred. I’ve suggested that the most serious charge might be manslaughter, which does not require such a demanding standard of proof. While it’s true that premeditation may be formulated in seconds before a criminal act, with what is known at the moment, it seems that the police may have acted negligently, but not with premeditated malice as specified in the language of most statutes, which would be necessary for a murder conviction in most jurisdictions. As the information available in this case currently stands, it remains most likely that this is a classic case of one error or misunderstanding after another building inexorably to an avoidable death.

Confederate Yankee: The Erik Scott Shooting: Update 3

Since the second update, many interesting developments have come to light and many questions have been answered, or at least, more informed suppositions can reasonably be made. However, complete and accurate original source videos and audio and transcripts are still not available, making accurate analysis difficult. Sadly, far too many of the details remain unknown, and perhaps, purposely or even criminally so. In update four of this series, I’ll get into more specific analysis of an audio/transcript of the initial 9-11 call from Costco security employee Shai (pronounced “Shay”) Lierley to a metro dispatcher, and will try to synchronize a partial transcript of police radio traffic to that 9-11 call to produce a more complete picture of events. This update, the third, will deal primarily with analysis of Inquest testimony and related issues.

Readers commenting on the first two installments have raised concerns about the relative veracity of police officers and lawyers in interpretation of the issues relating to this case. Each has an important role to play in the criminal justice system, and sometimes, those roles overlap, to the discomfort of all involved. Perhaps it would be useful to address an issue that will become more important as the case goes on: The relationships of lawyers--defense and prosecutorial--with the police.

Police attorney relationships are far more complex than one might imagine, and seldom anything like those depicted on TV police dramas. Describing them as love/hate relationships might be a good baseline for further consideration. Attorneys generally consider themselves to be more educated and thus, more intelligent than police officers who by comparison often have no higher education. While more and more police agencies are requiring at least an associate’s degree (two years of college), a substantial portion of American police officers have only a high school education.

This is not, in and of itself, a bar to excellence in law enforcement. In many ways, excellent officers are born with a particular set of genetic endowments that give them distinct and obvious advantages over others regardless of their respective amounts of higher education. Simply put, some people are just born better capable of excelling in some jobs than others. While a reasonable argument can be made that an undergraduate degree has the potential to produce a well rounded individual with a broad base of potentially useful knowledge, common sense and street smarts tend to trump a bachelor’s any day in police work. At the same way, law schools produce graduates with a very wide range of practical abilities. Abraham Lincoln, for example, was known as an outstanding lawyer, but spent not a day in law school.

Some attorneys find it difficult to see police officers as professionals, looking down on them in very real ways. Police officers tend not to respond well to condescension, and this can lead to real tension in the relationships between officers and prosecutors in particular. It should not be assumed that prosecutors are automatically friends and colleagues of the police, and it should surely not be assumed that they will, always and in every case, support or cover for the police. This makes perfect sense if a given prosecutor believes officers to be lower than him or herself on the evolutionary ladder.
However, it can almost always be expected that defense attorneys will have an adversarial relationship with the police. The old maxim stands true: If the law and the facts are on your side, argue the law and the facts. If not, attack the police. Lawyers on all sides are supposed to seek justice above all, but some defense attorneys are predisposed to believe that the police are dim witted perjurers and brutalizing racists, and feeling the system thereby stacked against themselves and their clients, sometimes cut corners to try to even the playing field that they perceive is tilted in the prosecution’s favor. Such male lawyers often wear ponytails. Go figure.

It may also be useful to consider that most attorneys are not, in fact, expert in the Constitution and the law as it applies to the criminal justice system (as in medicine, lawyers generalize or specialize), and that many police officers may often have more practical knowledge of specific statutes, procedures and methods than many attorneys. In my final police assignment, I was a detective specializing in stalking and the burglary of vehicles. In that role, I of necessity learned a great deal about the related statutes, court precedent relating to search and seizure, psychology, the applicable insurance statutes and many other esoteric bits of knowledge. Knowing this, prosecutors--and sometimes defense attorneys--often asked questions about where to find specific statutes, their interpretation and application and related issues. I doubt that any of them considered me a law enforcement Einstein (nor did I), but they were practical enough to consult a useful, available source. Wise men know and accept, above all, what they don’t know.

With this in mind, can any meaningful conclusions be drawn from the apparent relationship of the Las Vegas prosecutors and the Metro Police? Can reasonable inferences be made based on the performance of the police and prosecutors in the Coroner’s Inquest and the eventual verdict? Indeed they can.

GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE INQUEST TO DATE (09-24-10):

Scott has been overwhelmingly portrayed by prosecutors as a drug addict so badly and visibly impaired by drugs that he was prostrating himself on check out conveyors, throwing merchandise about the store, threatening and alarming staff and customers, and who, when confronted by police, drew and pointed a weapon at them, causing them to immediately shoot him seven times, according to Dr. Alane Olson a medical examiner with the Las Vegas Coroner’s Office. Two rounds initially fired by Officer William Mosher struck Scott in the chest, and five fired by Officers Joshua Start and Thomas Mendiola, struck him from the rear, including one that entered Scott’s buttocks, traversed his bowels and lodged in his chest. These five bullets, but particularly the bullet that entered Scott’s buttocks, will figure prominently in the future. Olson also testified that Scott had “lethal levels” of Morphine and Xanax in his blood.” However, several witnesses contradicted the prosecution’s tone and theory. Because no cross examination of witnesses was allowed, it’s difficult to tell with certainty if these statements were an unexpected and unwelcome surprise to the prosecutors or were included in an attempt to provide the appearance of balance to the televised proceedings.

SOME EXAMPLES OF TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THE PROSECUTION THEORY:

Arlene Houghton, a cashier, said Scott lost his balance and “tumbled onto a checkout conveyor belt, ” and that Samantha Sterner, Scott’s girlfriend, propped him up on a shopping cart. Houghton said Scott’s face was flushed, his eyes unfocused and glassy. “He turned around and looked at me and said, ‘I guess I really am (expletive)-up,’ and they walked away.”

Cashier John Nikitas said Scott knocked over a sign. “He told the lady with him, ‘I told you I should not be in this effing place when I’m this drunk.’”

Coleen Kullberg, a part time Costco employee was leaving the store and saw Scott staring at an officer who told him to get on the ground “at least five times.” She said “he reached behind him and pulled out his gun and aimed it at the officer...at that time the officer shot him.” Kullberg described Scott, just prior to being shot: “He was like dazed. He was just looking at him. He wasn’t obeying any of his commands.”

Security Officer Shai Lierley and Assistant Manager Vince Lopez spoke with Scott separately and told him that his gun wasn’t allowed. According to Lopez, Scott became “extremely agitated,” and told Lopez “...it’s a (expletive)-up policy and he continued to say he was a Green Beret, he could carry a gun wherever he went, and he wasn’t going to put up with that.” Lopez also testified that Scott imitated a gun with his hand, put it to Lopez’s head and said that if someone really did that, he would take care of the situation.

Customer Annette Eatherton saw Scott, being confronted by the officers, reach for his waist, and heard an officer say, “‘don’t do that, don’t do that,’ and he did it and they shot him.” After the first shot, Eatherton saw a gun in a “gun rug” fall to the ground in front of Scott. Annette’s husband Wentworth gave similar testimony but thought that Scott was trying to disarm, not shoot.

SOME EXAMPLES OF TESTIMONY CONTRADICTING THE PROSECUTION THEORY:

Edward Fishman heard an officer order Scott to “drop it,” and heard no other commands. He could not see anything in Scott’s hands and saw Scott reach toward his side, his shirt came up, and he was shot. Fishman did not see or hear Scott take an aggressive stance, point anything at the officer, or say anything. Fishman, a physician, said that after being shot, Scott’s hands were above his head before he fell to his knees and then face down on the ground. Fishman did not see anything drop from Scott’s hands or anything on the ground near him.

Fishman watched an officer handcuff Scott, but no one checked his pulse. Fishman testified that he was so shocked and surprised that none of the officers did anything to help Scott that he was to afraid to approach and ask to assist.

Customer Wendy Wolkenstein saw an officer with his gun drawn confront Scott outside the store. The officer was yelling at Scott to get down on the ground. Herding her children behind cover, she saw Scott’s elbow move back toward his waist or pocket and the officers fired. Looking back at Scott, she saw his hands in the air. She did not hear Scott say anything to the officers, but his back was to her.

Scott’s girlfriend, Samantha Sterner, did not testify, possibly on the advice of her attorney, who told the media that she was anxious to testify, but not in a one-sided forum. Prosecutors instead played a recording of her statement to police made after the shooting.

Sterner told the police that Scott was acting normally and his interaction with Costco employees was “amicable,” though she said she wasn’t present for all of those interactions. She did tell Scott, as they walked toward the exit that he was probably the reason for the evacuation, and he seemed “surprised.” Sterner saw an employee point out Scott to a uniformed officer as they stepped outdoors.
“He (Officer William Mosher) immediately draws his weapon and tells him to get on the ground,” Sterner said, adding that Scott put his hands up, intending to disarm. Sterner screamed at the officers that Scott was in the military and had a concealed weapons permit. She told them not to shoot, but when Scott raised his shirt to reveal the gun and “...grabbed it to put it on the ground...”Mosher fired. Sterner believes that Mosher “...was too aggressive...” and believes he would have fired no matter what Scott did. "I just think that this officer was out of line,” she said.

TESTIMONY OF SCOTT'S PERSONAL PHYSICIANS:

Dr. Joseph Gnoyski did not believe that Scott was a drug seeker and took drugs to deal with pain, the treatment of which is Gnoyski’s speciality. He testified that Scott had a physiological dependency, and that over time, he was getting better. Of the three testifying physicians, only Gnoyski testified to ordering an MRI or similar diagnostic test for Scott. The MRI indicated that he did have back damage, which Gnoyski attributed to a “paratrooping accident,” “a football accident,” and “a more recent automobile accident.”

Gnoyski said “This guy [Scott] works out every day. It’s not like he is seeking a buzz just to lie around...I don’t believe this man was trying to get a buzz...It just doesn’t mesh with his character.” Gnoyski described Scott as an "elite athlete."

During a casual visit to his office, Gnoyski felt that Scott appeared groggy. “It wasn’t like he was out of control, that he was going crazy.” Gnoyski drafted a letter to terminate their relationship, but changed his mind. Gnoyski said “I have a lot of respect for him.”

Dr. Shari Klein treated Scott for about two years, until about ten months prior to the shooting. Klein testified that Scott, at some point, suggested that she prescribe Hydrocordone, but she did not prescribe that particular medication. She said that Scott stopped seeing her when she began a concierge practice (where a physician sees a limited number of patients, charging substantially more for the individual treatment) and he could no longer afford her.

Dr. Daniel Kim testified that he began treating Scott on 02-02-10 for chronic pain. Kim prescribed medication but felt that Scott was taking too much: “He doubled up everything that I gave to him.” Kim, who felt that Scott had an addiction to Hydrocordone, terminated Scott and gave him a list of detoxification centers. Kim would not agree that interactions with Scott led to Scott’s being shot but thought that he might have more forcefully suggested detoxification.

TESTIMONY ANALYSIS: This testimony attempts to portray Scott as a man so under the influence of drugs that he could barely stand, yet he also reportedly said that he was drunk, though the sources consulted for this article did not mention the presence of alcohol in Scott’s blood. Significant in the testimony of the doctors is the absence of the common behavior of drug addicts who try to trick multiple doctors to simultaneously prescribe large amounts of narcotic medications. Scott apparently sought out medical treatment for intractable pain, which was actually physiologically based, and worked with single physicians in turn.

Most witnesses testified that Scott not only did not respond to officers, but drew his weapon and pointed it at the officers, though one saw only an elbow moving toward Scott’s back and saw Scott’s hands “in the air” moments after being shot. Officer commands heard by witnesses range from “don’t do that; don’t do that,” to “get on the ground,” and “drop it,” but no clear picture was drawn of the time frame or circumstances, including which of the three officers made these statements or why.
Only one of the witnesses saw a gun “in a gun rug” fall to the ground. The others did not see a gun or see Scott point a gun at the officers. According to police testimony and a photograph produced at the Inquest, Scott’s .45 ACP 1911 type handgun at some point and in some way, made it to the ground somewhere near him and was photographed by police, reportedly where it was found. The weapon displayed in the photograph was still fully in its inside the waistband holster, cocked and locked (the most common method for carrying this type of handgun, with the safety apparently still on. What is most interesting is that the holster completely enclosed the trigger guard and trigger of the weapon on both sides of the frame. In order for Scott to have fired the weapon, he would have had to push his trigger finger between the leather, which was still likely tightly molded to the frame of the weapon, and the frame, snap off the safety--which was also at least partially, possibly fully, covered by the holster--with his thumb, or more likely, would have had to remove the holster, which would have taken a very emphatic and forceful downward flinging motion if made one handed, or most likely, would have required that Scott grasp the holster with his left hand to pull it from the handgun. Either option would have taken very obvious movements and time, time which Scott was not afforded. None of the witnesses testified to this. The testimony to date seems to support Sterner’s contention that Scott, surprised and trying to respond to conflicting commands delivered simultaneously and in a matter of seconds, was trying to disarm.

 What is also missing from the media accounts is any time frame. A man removing a weapon to disarm himself does not move with the speed and obvious intent of a man trying to bring a muzzle on target to fire, yet there has been apparently no attempt by the prosecution to clarify this point. One might argue that an officer cannot be expected to tell the difference between a holstered, safed handgun being voluntarily surrendered and an unholstered handgun being brought rapidly, aggressively onto target, but this kind of situation is common in shoot/don’t shoot training and officers are expected to be well trained and calm enough to take the few fractions of a second necessary to be sure before firing. It is not easy, but no one is forced to become a police officer.

What is also remarkable is that while the prosecution and police have acknowledged the firing of seven rounds and at least generally accounted for the final resting places of those rounds, there has been no statement about the possible firing of additional rounds and where they came to rest. This is significant in that studies have uniformly found that in officer shootings, commonly less than 30% of rounds fired by officers strike their intended targets. Are we to understand that these three officers fired only seven rounds, and that all seven were hits? This would be particularly amazing if any of the rounds were fired after Off. Mosher’s original two rounds struck Scott in the chest. At that point, Scott fell to his knees and then onto his face, which presents another significant problem for the police and prosecution.

At the time of the shooting, Off. Moser, 38, had been working for LV Metro for approximately five years and one month. Media accounts have not indicated if he had prior law enforcement experience, but do speak of his involvement in one prior police shooting. This is also significant, but more on this shortly. Off. Joshua Stuart, 28, had been with Metro approximately one year and 11 months. Again, I’m unaware of any prior police experience. Off. Thomas Mendiola, 23, had been with Metro approximately one year and four months. Considering his age, it would have been unlikely that he had any prior police experience as 21 is the minimum age for police service virtually everywhere.

We do not, as yet, know exactly where the officers stood relative to Scott, or their distances from him at the time each shot was fired. Did they remain stationary until shooting ceased, or were they moving as they fired? We still do not know why they fired after Mosher’s initial two shots. Most disturbing, however is the improbability of Scott taking five rounds in the back under the currently known circumstances. The only reasonable scenario presented by the evidence known to the public is that Scott was facing all three officers who were also facing him. We can assume that the officers, two of whom had little apparent time on the job (this is a significant issue--ask any experienced cop), may have tried to move to one side or the other, remembering basic tactics, but all were likely oriented facing Scott, with one or two perhaps at a slight angle to his sides. All the testimony indicates that after the initial two shots, Scott dropped to his knees and then, fell forward, toward the officers, onto his face. Struck twice in the heart, he was likely rapidly bleeding out internally, and rapidly dropping blood pressure may have rendered him more or less immediately unconscious.

How then is it possible that he took five additional rounds in the back, and who fired them? Did any of the officers very quickly move around Scott, placing Scott between himself and his fellow officers? Did they fire while he was falling, or more likely, only after he was already face down? The Medical Examiner testified that she could not tell the distances from the muzzles of any of the shots, nor do media accounts reveal the tracks of any of the rounds, with one exception.

It is reasonable to believe, particularly with the unusual, one might say, phenomenal quality of the marksmanship displayed by the officers that they were quite close to Scott, which is, in and of itself, very significant. Let’s assume for the sake of an experiment that Scott is face down, his head toward the officers. Pace off ten or twelve feet--the width of many rooms in many homes--and, placing a friend, or if you’re a bit squeamish, a pillow, on the floor in Scott’s position relative to the officers, and point your imaginary handgun at the target. At even that distance, the human back is a small, hard to hit target and any rounds fired would travel downward, likely lodging in the pelvis, buttocks, or even the thighs. In any case, the bullet tracks would be at a steep angle and would traverse a great deal of the body unless they struck large bones. Moving closer to the target, notice how the angle changes, until, standing over the body, the target becomes much, much easier to hit--the distance from muzzle to body being two feet or less--and the bullets would traverse the body at an approximate right angle.

For the prosecution’s theory, however, the most vexing problem is the bullet that entered Scott’s buttocks, traversed his pelvis and lodged in his chest. Unless the muzzle of the handgun that fired the round was near the ground when the round was fired, it’s hard to imagine how this could have occurred unless the officer was not only behind Scott when the round was fired, and thus had placed Scott between himself and the other officers--a virtual circular firing squad all officers are taught to avoid at all costs--but was also diving to the ground or on the ground at the time. One other possibility is that the round was fired by a standing officer, and the bullet, striking the pelvis or spine, was deflected on an internal path parallel with Scott’s prone body, but the ME did not so testify, and the problem of how an officer, in what was a mere handful of seconds, was able to maneuver into a position that would make any of this possible still exists.

Off. Mosher’s reported prior shooting, which was apparently found to be justified, is of interest because the overwhelming majority of police officers complete their careers without having fired their weapons at anyone. Thus, the officer who has had to shoot a suspect on even one occasion is, in most police agencies, unusual. An officer who has shot two or more, in a short span of years, is even more unusual. This does not in and of itself prove wrong doing on the part of such an officer. Perhaps he was merely unlucky. Perhaps he worked in high risk areas, or in an assignment that made violent confrontations more likely. But the fact that this was Off. Mosher’s second shooting should cause anyone investigating this case to be extra careful to pay attention to detail, as should any prosecutor charged with reviewing the case in making a charging decision because thankfully, Off. Mosher is in an exclusive class among American police.

Some commenters have suggested that police officers look for opportunities to shoot citizens in a soft of bizarre initiation rite. Thankfully, the statistics, and experience, do not bear this out. Indeed, officers wonder how they will perform in a deadly force encounter, perhaps even hope that they might have the chance, but there is nothing sinister in this. In fact, they are repeatedly confronted with this issue in employment interviews and training. They have to consider such issues and be willing to run to, rather than away from, the sound of gunfire. Any officer who has asked him or herself whether they can and will fire at another human being, possibly taking their life, if necessary, and who has not answered firmly and affirmatively, is a danger to them self and the public. Officers are comforted by the knowledge that the odds are on their side; it is unlikely that they will ever find themselves in that situation. Still, type A, adrenaline fueled personalities--and in many respects, that’s who we want for police officers when maniacs intent or rape or worse are breaking into our homes--will wonder, and anticipate and train hard to be prepared if the worst ever comes to pass. That is what we pay them to do. And they will pray that they do the right thing and go home that night when their shift is done.
One of the fundamental questions in this case is whether any Costco employee actually asked Scott to leave the store and if so, his response to that request. It is reasonable to believe that if anyone representing Costco had asked Scott to leave at any time, the police would have noted it and the prosecutor would have been sure to secure such testimony, but thus far, this does not seem to be the case. Considering the very negative thrust of the other evidence presented to Scott’s detriment, if such evidence, of an angry, armed man refusing a lawful order to leave the premises existed, surely it would have been made public at the inquest, but it has not.

Also interesting is the exclusive testimony secured by Confederate Yankee regarding Scott’s character by a competitor of Scott’s. This testimony, which was not produced during the Inquest as the witness fears Metro and prosecutorial reprisal, does not support the negative character sketch drawn by the prosecution.

As expected, no Costco or other video was presented at the Inquest. Recent information indicates that the police will claim that all of the Costco video from every camera that might have captured an image simply does not exist due to an technical malfunction known to Costco before the event which was not corrected until after the event. While this is possible, one would surely be forgiven for questioning the convenience--for the police--of this kind of coincidence, particularly when such video has the potential to unambiguously resolve the central issues in the case. Whether any police recordings exist may never be known. At the very least, media outlets may be able to provide footage which indicates whether any police vehicles potentially equipped with video were pointing toward the area of the shooting. Most police video cameras are focused through the windshields of patrol cars. If it can be established that any police vehicles were pointed in that direction, the possibility of police video exists.
A quick side note in response to several posters: The criminal justice system is often behind times in adopting standards of evidence that reflect the latest, greatest technology. In all matters of evidence, original sources and items are virtually the universally required standard, though judges do usually have some flexibility in interpreting the related statutes. However, that interpretation will almost always take place long after evidence is gathered. The police will reasonably believe that they are required to gather original materials and sources unless they are absolutely certain that copies will suffice.
The potentially missing video remains, at the very least, a public relations disaster for the police, and one which may not go unnoticed by local political leaders. The Law Vegas Review-Journal reported on 09-25-10 that Clark County Commissioners were concerned by the “skewed” proceedings and would form a committee to review potential changes in the Inquest system to allow a more adversarial approach more likely to expose all of the relevant facts necessary to produce a fair result. In response, prosecutors said that in a more adversarial hearing, “police officers might not testify.” This should be cause for real public concern in that any prosecutor knows that officers have no choice about such matters and are required by law to testify. Officers know this too. In fact, prosecutors routinely issue subpoenas mandating the appearance of officers at even routine hearings. This should be a matter of concern for Las Vegas residents as it may indicate that the prosecutors involved hold a low opinion of the intelligence of the public or may care little for what the public thinks. Yet at the moment, at least the potential for limited reform may exist.

Another bit of missing video, or potentially photography, is images of the merchandise allegedly strewn all over Costco by Scott. Several store employees have testified that Scott was so deranged that he was, in a virtual frenzy, ripping open merchandise and actually throwing it in all directions. If this was so, and to the degree suggested by Costco employee testimony, surely the police photographed it? Yet no media account of which I am aware mentions such evidence. It is another interesting coincidence that if the police did not record such potentially meaningful evidence, all internal and external Costco store video for that time is also apparently lost.

So it would appear that the prosecutors and the police are indeed on the same page in this case. Whatever animosity they might bear toward each other is being put aside and a common front presented. What is the significance of the apparent approach of the police and prosecutors to date? Even if one accepts their theory that Scott was a drug addict and an aggressive gun nut intent on carrying a gun wherever he wanted, who, through gross drug-induced impairment, brought about his own death, all of this should rightfully be nothing more than mitigating evidence that might have some bearing on the severity of a charge to be brought against the officers, or to be considered only after a potential future conviction as mitigating factors relating to sentencing.

What still remains is what the officers knew or reasonably could have known or inferred at the time they confronted Scott at the main entrance of Costco and made the decision to pull the trigger. It is this event, compressed in time, that should be the prosecutor’s foremost concern. Scott’s life history and his physical and mental health status could have, in at least some way, put him on a collision course with the police that day. But the ultimate question is whether they, knowing nothing about Scott but what they heard on the radio on the way to Costco, and apparently finding themselves surprised when a Costco employee suddenly pointed out a man they had never before seen, were justified under the law by his actions in the handful of seconds before they fired at least seven rounds into him. Under this, the only standard that truly matters, the evidence presented at the Inquest does not yet tend to favor or conclusively exonerate the police.

IN THE NEXT UPDATE, NUMBER 4: The 9-11 call and a partial radio transcript are meshed and analyzed.

Note: The primary sources for this article were the Las Vegas Sun and the Las Vegas Review-Journal.

Confederate Yankee: Witness in Scott Case May be Donor to D.A.

It is quite possible that the man in question is another Christopher Villareale entirely, or that the man who donated $500 to the District Attorney's re-election warchest just happened to be an eyewitness to Erik Scott's shooting at the hands of Las Vegas police.

If the latter, disclosure seems to be the order of the day, considering the high-profile and controversial nature of the coroner's inquest.

Confederate Yankee: The Erik Scott Shooting: Update 3.2

The next installment of this series, Update 4, which will analyze the 9-11 transcript presented at the Coroner’s Inquest (a visit to regarding that inquest is worth your time) and a partial radio transcript will be posted later this week, but so many commenters have raised excellent questions, as they so often do, that answering those questions may serve to clarify portions of the earlier updates and to further enlighten future updates. Consider this post Update 3.2.

Please keep in mind, gentle readers, that all that we can do in this series, and all that we are trying to do, is to provide informed background and plausible analysis using the facts and testimony generally available to the public. We can, upon occasion, break new facts and details not generally available, and we can make reasonable inferences based on those facts and details, but what we will always do our best to avoid is unreasonable literary bomb throwing. If the facts, and the reasonable inferences drawn from them, indicate that the police (or any other party) are wrong, we’ll make that case and explain why we believe it’s so. But no one should expect blanket pronouncements of malign intent, murder and mayhem unsupported by fact or reason.

Several commenters have been concerned about the police and their tendency toward perjury. Incredibly obvious and predictable disclaimer: Because the police are severely handicapped in hiring by being restricted to the human race, it is always possible that some police officers will behave inappropriately. They should not, but they do. That said, consider that the majority of arrests made by any police officer (did you know that a traffic ticket is an arrest?) are misdemeanors, offenses routinely settled without jail time by small fines. Perjury, on the other hand, is commonly a felony virtually everywhere. My experience teaches me that few officers will risk not only their reputations but their careers and potentially, their freedom, when so little is at stake. The other side of the coin is that when a great deal is at stake, when their reputations, careers and freedom might hang in the balance, perjury might become more likely. Such is the reality of human nature. Police officers are routinely accused of perjury. Have you ever heard anyone say: “Yeah, I got a speeding ticket today and the officer was completely justified in giving it to me?” I thought not. Should perjury be discovered and punished? Of course, but that’s a matter for each law enforcement agency and each community. If a given agency is rotten, community elected officials have the power to clean it out. If the elected officials refuse, citizens have the power to periodically clean them out. If the citizens refuse, they’re making a choice by not making a choice.

Information from another commenter suggests that Erik Scott’s handgun was removed from his waistband holster by an EMT and placed on the ground. I’m unsure if that commenter meant to say that an EMT removed the handgun, still in its inside the waistband holster, and placed it on the ground. According to the commenter, this information comes from an EMT’s report of the incident, which apparently has not been made public, nor was it introduced during the Inquest. The photograph displayed during the Inquest depicts a 1911 type handgun in a holster which the police said belonged to Scott and was photographed in place. I’m unaware of specific testimony regarding how it came to rest there, but the implication in line with the Police/Prosecutor theory is that Scott himself removed the weapon from his waistband at his back, holster and all, pointed it at the officers and dropped it at some point during the shooting.

If this is true, another bizarre and inexplicable element has been added to this case, so bizarre and inexplicable that I tend to discount it. If true, this means that after shooting and handcuffing Scott, the officers failed to disarm him, failing to remove even the weapon known to them. In other words, having, seconds earlier, apparently survived a deadly force encounter, the officers, through negligence, did nothing to remove all possibility of deadly, continuing danger to themselves and others. All available facts suggest that any officer handcuffing Scott should not have failed to detect his handgun, imprinted under his shirt, or partially exposed. Failing to remove and secure it would indicate such gross incompetence on the part of the officers that it is hard to believe and would require substantial proof to sustain, proof such as an EMTs report made public accompanied by that EMTs testimony, hopefully supported by the testimony of other EMTs. On the other hand, if it is true, the Police/Prosecution theory falls entirely apart. If EMTs found Scott’s handgun, in its holster still in his waistband after he had been shot and handcuffed, the officer’s claim that Scott pointed that weapon at them is, to put it very, very kindly, mistaken.

Another interesting tidbit is that the police have said that Scott was carrying two weapons, and at least one media outlet has indicated that “a second gun was found on Scott” by EMTs at some point in their contact with him, but I’ve not been able to find any details about just what that second weapon was, its chain of evidence, or how, if at all, if might have figured in this case other than to reflect very poorly on the officers involved whose search of Scott, post shooting, was apparently less than thorough. If he was carrying a second weapon, it’s unusual that it was apparently not prominently mentioned at the Inquest as it could potentially be used to depict Scott even more unfavorably. On the other hand, if the police did miss it, and an EMT did find it, that would tend to make the police look less than competent.

There is, given the information available, another (but not the only) plausible possibility. Confused by rapidly shouted, conflicting commands, Scott tried to disarm himself, reaching behind his back and removing his handgun, still in its holster. Evidence suggests that he may have done this, even telling the officers that he was disarming. Considering this scenario, what remains unknown is when the police began to fire. Did the mere downward movement of his raised hand trigger their fire? Did they wait until his hand disappeared behind his back? Did they, seeing something that might have resembled a gun (in this case, in its holster), appearing from behind Scott’s back even though it was not pointed in their direction, open fire? The Police/Prosecution theory requires that Scott remove the weapon from his waistband and, at some point, drop it. Unfortunately, that weapon was clearly still in its holster.
Several commenters have suggested that it did not matter, in making a deadly force decision, whether the weapon was or was not in its holster. If it was pointed at the officers, they had lawful justification to fire. This is a common scenario in shoot/don’t shoot training videos which one can reasonably expect that officers of a major metropolitan agency have experienced. Officers are expected to deal with exactly this kind of situation and train for it. Competent officers live in horror of shooting someone, even if completely justified, who turns out to have had in their hand a billfold or other item rather than the handgun the officer thought was there. Officers are expected to accurately make these distinctions before firing. Because they practice these scenarios, officers should be able to tell the difference, by observing a variety of factors, between someone trying to disarm or show them something, or someone in the drawing sequence of bringing a handgun on target from a holster. Officers do this successfully every day and untold thousands of citizens are alive because of their training and their ability to make these distinctions. To suggest that officers have no such duty would have disastrous consequences for us all, freeing officers to shoot at the merest hint of, rather than at reasonably convincing evidence, of danger.

Another commenter observed that officers were trained to shoot until they have stopped the actions that gave them justification to shoot and that initial action--a suspect preparing to shoot--is always faster than reaction--an officer’s response. Both are true, but with qualifications. Not only are officers trained to shoot to stop, but may legally use any number of rounds reasonably required, so long as they were initially justified in shooting. However, they are also responsible for each and every round fired and the safety of innocents. How then does one determine when the suspect has ceased hostilities and that shooting should stop? By observation. Officers must indeed be sufficiently aware of any situation so as to briefly pause after firing several rounds to determine if more are required. That this might take a second or less is not the issue. The only reasonable alternative is that once an officer fires a single round, they must empty their magazine until they are forced, by lack of ammunition, to finally assess the situation as they reload. This is obviously lunacy, but what other practical possibility exists? Action is indeed almost always faster than reaction, but officers understand this, and accepting it, train to overcome, to the greatest possible degree, this inherent disadvantage. This is absolutely necessary to prevent officers from firing too quickly with insufficient justification. No, they don’t have to absorb a suspect’s first round before returning fire, but there is a substantial range of action/response between firing too quickly and not responding properly. An officer’s actions in that gray area will be judged later by those who are not under fire and have months to review decisions officers had to make in seconds. This too, police officers understand and grudgingly accept.

Another commenter wondered about how the officers involved might have handled the approach to the situation differently. Officers train for situations of this kind, and again, to be kind, the approach in this shooting (based on what is currently known) does not appear to be what one would find in a “how to” textbook. In potential shooting situations, the police are trained to do whatever is necessary to control and contain the situation, and to the greatest degree possible, to protect the public. In other words, they should not do anything to provoke a fire fight in the middle of a crowd. Of course, bad guys don’t always give the police that option.

In this case, there is evidence to suggest that the police knew or should have known that they had the element of surprise. Apparently one or more officers were near the Costco entrance, perhaps even inside, and Scott and his girlfriend Samantha Sterner, walked past them. At that point, the police apparently did not know that Scott was the suspect they sought, and his behavior was obviously unremarkable to those officers. Update 4 will provide additional details about this, including the fact that Shai Lierley, the Costco security employee was apparently following Scott in the store, keeping him in sight while relaying Scott’s actions in real time to a dispatcher by cell phone. The police did know, for one of the first officers on the scene had ordered the evacuation, that all of the Costco customers were trying, simultaneously, yet in an apparently orderly manner, to leave the main doors of the store. At some point, a store employee pointed to Scott, essentially yelling “there he is!” This was apparently the first moment that the responding officers knew that Scott was their suspect, and the officers, exposed and caught by surprise in the open, with many innocent citizens in the line of fire, drew their weapons and the deadly confrontation began.

What should the officers have done? Remember, please, that I do not have a diagram of the Costco store and parking lot and that many of the details that I, or any competent tactician would need to render a truly informed opinion are, at this point, unavailable. However, common police training and experience do suggest a better (though not the only possible) approach.

Without being able to recognize the suspect on sight, and knowing only that he was still inside the store and was not actively, continuously violent, maintaining the element of surprise by silently approaching the store (which may have been done), parking police vehicles out of sight of the front doors, and keeping uniformed officers out of sight would have been wise. In a parking lot full of cars, this would not have been difficult. Calling in plainclothes personnel such as detectives or administrators would have also been wise if time permitted.

The next (in fact, a continuing) concern should have been knowing where Scott was and exactly what he was doing. As a field training officer, I always taught my trainees to, whenever possible, observe an animal in its natural habitat for a time before interacting with it. The officers should have identified Scott, kept their presence concealed and watched him for as long as possible. Absent an active shooter situation, which this clearly was not, this is almost always the smart thing to do. If, as this situation clearly indicated, Scott was unaware of the police and was showing every intention of simply walking to his vehicle, they should, while keeping him in sight, have allowed him to do just that. Why? To learn as much as possible about his state of mind and intentions through direct observation, to possibly locate his handgun, to minimize the possibility of a potential hostage situation and to separate Scott from the hundreds of customers streaming out of the store with him. Once Scott was in the parking lot, perhaps with many empty cars as a safer shooting backstop for errant rounds, only then should he have been confronted. Following this procedure would not only have been safer for the public, but would have allowed officers to maintain control of the situation, and to direct additional officers to keep citizens out of the line of fire as Scott was confronted.

A commenter suggested that Scott might have been brought under physical control by officers, and this is a possibility, but in order to work, the take down must have been a total surprise allowing Scott no time to react--as anyone might react to being rushed or grabbed by several people by surprise--before the officers could take physical control of him, identify themselves, and with luck, allow him to relax and be disarmed. This could have been a viable option, but again, allowing Scott to separate himself from the rest of the crowd before taking any action should have been high on the officer’s priority list. Unfortunately, what is known suggests strongly that the officers were completely surprised by Scott’s appearance at the door, and caught in the open, immediately drew down on Scott and began to yell conflicting orders.

Interestingly, Metro Capt. Patrick Neville has said that none of the customers were ever in danger from police fire as the three officers ensured that a pillar that supported a canopy was the backdrop for their fire. To observe that this is, again to be kind, fanciful, is an understatement. Such a pillar could have scarcely been much wider than, if as wide as, a human torso, and would likely have been made of concrete, structural steel, or some combination of the two. Rounds striking it would not have been absorbed, but deflected at unpredictable angles. The only possible way that such a construct could have served as even a dangerous backstop is if it was directly behind Scott in a straight line with the officer’s fire, which would have to place them actually closer than shoulder to shoulder as they fired in order to ensure that each missed round fired struck the pillar dead center at an exact right angle to minimize the risk of ricochet. This is, of course, practically impossible. God forbid that any of them were behind the others as they fired (the potential consequences of that should be obvious).
One of the larger problems for the police will be exactly how many rounds were fired, by whom, and where did each round come to rest? The police have acknowledged only seven rounds thus far and all were reportedly hits on Scott, none of which exited his body to strike anything else. At least one round, however, seems to have been a rather miraculous shot. As Update 3 pointed out, this kind of accuracy, while possible, is against the laws of probability. The idea that three officers, caught by surprise and engaging seconds later in a firefight would have the presence of mind to simultaneously pick out a pillar in the background, realize that it would serve as an appropriate bullet stop, and/or maneuver so as to place it at the termination of their line of fire, is utter, after the fact, dissembling nonsense. These issues should be pursued by the local media until they are convincingly and honestly answered or refuted.

Finally, for this update to an update, a commenter took exception to my assertion that we want police officers to be type A, adrenaline fueled personalities. Please allow me to elaborate. Police work has been said to be, quite accurately, 99% boredom and 1% sheer terror. Any police officer who will not admit to having been scared should be immediately suspect. All sane officers are, from time to time, scared. However, they are scared so often that they learn how to effectively control and channel that fear, that adrenaline that all humans experience as the fight or flight response to danger, or they leave police work. We do indeed want our police to be aggressive, apparently fearless, brave and assertive, but we expect them to be calm, rational, humane, analytical and right 100% of the time. Special forces soldiers must possess essentially the same personalities. They are commonly known as the quiet professionals. So it is with the police. They have an extraordinarily difficult job that makes extraordinary demands on them, demands that few human beings would want to experience or could handle. Yet, they know all of this and accept it. We honor them by demanding that they adhere to the highest standards of their profession and when we do not, we dishonor those who do.

Confederate Yankee will post Update 4 later in the week.